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From the Editors
As we begin our seventh year of publication, we are pleased to make two announcements.
The Editorial Staff has been enlarged to include Joseph Levangie, a successful entrepreneur
and angel investor living in Bedford, Massachusetts. Adding Levangie to the staff will provide
an experienced hand in “real-world” entrepreneurship activity. He wrote the Journal’s first
“Practitioner’s Corner” article in our last issue and this will now become a permanent outlet
for Levangie’s wisdom and insights. Welcome, Joe!
The Journal is also pleased to announce a Special Issue for Spring 2005. The topic is
“Measurement Issues in Entrepreneurship” and the Guest Editors will be Drs. Jill Kickul and
Sylvia Maxfield of the Simmons School of Management and Dr. Norris Krueger of
TechConnect.
More information about this exciting Special Issue is available on the facing page. Note
carefully the submission deadline of October 15, 2004.
As always, the Journal’s Editorial Staff welcomes your comments and reactions to our 
bi-annual effort to publish the best manuscripts we receive from our international audience. In
this issue, we include articles concerning employee equity and incentive compensation issues;
factors driving growth in international entrepreneurship; and microenterprise collaboration in
third-sector communities. We also include two interviews with successful New England 
entrepreneurs, our second “Practitioner’s Corner” article, and a book review that revisits an
intriguing owner’s perspective of how he managed his start-up company. Enjoy!
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John Bello, aka the “Lizard King,” has been lionized in thebusiness press as having been the brilliant entrepreneurwho started a beverage company from scratch in early
1995 with his partner, Tom Schwalm, and then sold the product
line to PepsiCo seven years later for a reported $375 million.
What many people do not know is how close Bello came to fail-
ing with his SoBe line of innovative drinks.
NEJE: Your great success must make you a very sought-
after speaker in MBA programs across the country.
Bello: It’s true. I travel extensively talking to high school,
college, and business school students—anyone who will
listen—whenever I can about what it takes to be an entre-
preneur. I have fun with MBA students, whom I tease. I
tell them, “You aren’t likely to be entrepreneurs or else
you wouldn’t be here. You’d be out starting your own
businesses and making money for yourselves.”  That real-
ly gets to them. Shakes them up.
NEJE: However, isn’t it true, John, that an MBA degree
can help entrepreneurs as much as it can those headed for
corporate careers?
Bello: Perhaps, but I believe entrepreneurship cannot be
taught, and at best, most universities just teach analytics.
They don’t teach how to overcome the inbred scourge to
successful enterprise: Fear of failure. The worry about
financial and job security paralyzes a lot of people from
pursuing their dreams.
NEJE: What about business skills you can learn in college
and then in graduate school?  
Bello: Certainly, business school programs impart impor-
tant skills, such as how to conduct market research or
how to analyze a balance sheet, but the really successful
entrepreneur needs to have an intimate knowledge and
awareness of the product and the market. Passion is the
key driver. Do it, move it, make it happen. You can’t sit
your way to success. You need to talk to the trade and
interact with consumers. Salesmanship. That’s the stuff
you don’t get in an MBA program. I have an MBA from
Tuck at Dartmouth. Good time, good people, and good
analytic education. But, what I learned about process and
marketing, I learned at General Foods and in the street. At
some point, you have to decide whether you have the
intestinal fortitude, perseverance, and smarts to put
together a successful venture. With entrepreneurs, it is
deeds, not dialogue.
NEJE: Did you know right after grad school you wanted
to be an entrepreneur?
Bello:  I had a sense from the start that I didn’t fit into the
corporate mold. Or at least, I knew myself enough to
know that I was a better leader than a follower. In the
navy as an officer, I did well but it wasn’t easy. I had trou-
ble following orders that were “busy work.” In Vietnam,
that changed. My job was clear and my CO let me do my
thing with my team. We were successful doing things
almost “by the book.”  The book, to me, is for non-
thinkers. I guess I’ve always been an iconoclast. Basically,
if I am motivated and have an objective I believe in, I’ll
show up with the goods. The lesson here is have a love
and passion for what you do. Most people in this world
settle for security and what’s in front of them.
Circumstances sometime dictate that, but in America, you
can be whatever you want to be.
Back to Vietnam, I was put in charge of, among other
things, a small “store” on the Mekong Delta that support-
ed PBR’s—an Apocalypse Now reality show. At 25, I had
control of 60 men and was responsible for the care and
feeding of 24 riverboats but the fun job was the base store.
With the help of my troops, we turned that tiny shaving
cream and cigarette store into a multimillion-dollar oper-
ation. We had generals showing up in their helicopters
ready to buy television sets, cameras, stereo equipment,
and tapes of Iron Butterfly, Steppenwolf, and CCR  at
great prices. And the profits paid for base welfare and
recreation. It was an experience.
NEJE: So from Vietnam you came back to the States and
tried your hand at entrepreneurship here?
Bello: No, I ran a navy exchange at Moffett Field,
California, and upon leaving the navy, earned an MBA
from Tuck. After graduating as an Edward Tuck Scholar,
I went into corporate life with General Foods, then
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PepsiCo, and finally the National Football League. I did
well because of performance but didn’t pay attention to
the politics. I wasn’t good at that game but I was good at
making money for other people. Besides, I found that
process was usually an end, and not a means, and that
careers were built on both process and politics. That
wasn’t me.
A lot of people argue about whether entrepreneurs are
“made” or “born.”  I think that people are action-oriented
or not. And either you are a risk-taker or rule-maker rather
than a “by-the-book” type. Rules in marketing, to me, are
guidelines. You simply cannot teach that to people.
I also believe that no matter how good you are, there
are many things in a corporate environment that are
beyond your control. I tell people in my talks that typical-
ly, they will all be fired sooner or later and they better be
prepared. I did an outstanding job at NFL Properties,
building the company into a $250 million business and
creating the template as to how sports marketing was
done. When the new commissioner came in, he wanted
his own team and I was forced out. It was time to leave.
Change is good. But you better plan for the eventuality. It
happens to virtually everyone.
NEJE: It sounds like you got fired somewhere along the
line.
Bello: Not fired, exactly, but I saw the handwriting on the
wall after almost 15 years working in the NFL’s Licensing
and Properties Division. I knew I had to leave. It was a
shock to me; it was 1993 and I was 47 years old but I had
run my course at the NFL. I took a year off wondering
what to do next when a buddy called me from Arizona
Beverages and asked me to join them in restructuring the
brand to make it more attractive as a take-over target. I
only lasted four, or maybe five, months as a consultant. It
was tough because they didn’t like my ideas and I firmly
believed I could do a better job than they were doing. We
really clashed. I came back East thinking that maybe my
time with Arizona was well spent because I was intrigued
with the opportunities in the beverage industry.
NEJE: The beverage category is so saturated. Why did you
think you could make a difference?
Bello: Call it ego, or maybe it was intuition or stupidity,
but I saw how California Coolers had made it big, then
Clearly Canadian, and then Arizona Teas. I felt there was
still plenty of room left for a more relevant lifestyle brand.
So, in December 1994, I decided to start a beverage
company with a partner, Tom Schwalm, who had 24 years
of beverage experience and a big checkbook. We sought
outside investors but put in plenty of our own money to
start the business. It took a year to develop the concept of
“South Beach” drinks. No income, no support system. I
wanted to introduce a beverage built on lifestyle. That’s
so important these days. Consumers are advertised to
death; they’re bored with most of the new products that
try to get their attention, and so these products fail. I
wanted to develop something special for the marketplace,
something that could generate a lot of “buzz” and word-
of-mouth advertising, more credible and a lot less costly.
We traveled down to South Beach, Florida, to get a
sense of the hot, hip, and trendy lifestyle for which SoBe
was known. While there, we saw lots of lizards around
the city, including a fresco lizard on the Abbey Hotel that
became our new product icon. We thought we were on to
something so we decided to call our product “South
Beach,” and we created a glass bottle design that incorpo-
rated a lizard on it. 
We had our brand name and we had the packaging.
Now we had to develop innovative flavors and a strong
product benefit for our consumers. We worked with fla-
vor and bottling companies to see what strategic alliances
we could form with them. It wasn’t easy. It is a cutthroat
business but all is fair in the marketing wars—threats, law
suits, intimidation, lack of funding, everything is against
you. You have to believe in yourself and persevere.
However, there was no way we were going to be pushed
around. We eventually found companies who were will-
ing to work with us and launched the brand in December
1995.
NEJE: You were on your way.
Bello: Or so we thought. Just three months into the ven-
ture, by February 1996, we knew we had some signifi-
cant problems. There were production problems. We
were having trouble getting enough distribution and
our investors were balking at putting in more money.
We had already spent $2 million and they weren’t about
to fork over more cash. Consumers liked some of what
we had done, but that wasn’t enough to break through.
At that point, some entrepreneurs would have called
it quits and given up. Or, some might have insisted they
had the right mix and gone off a cliff holding fast to
their original concept. I knew we had problems and we
had to face reality. Either we’d change our thinking or
fail. We started over—mortgaged our homes, shortened
the name of the product from “South Beach” to “SoBe,”
altered the labeling to add two lizards in a “yin and
yang” relationship (that was my daughter’s suggestion,
by the way), and changed the product’s formulation.
We walked away from a “me-too” iced tea, to a line of
healthy refreshment beverages, capitalizing on an
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emerging interest in energy and health drinks. Health
was a cultural shift by the mid-1990s, so instead of just
a “fun” drink, we decided to change our positioning
and produce a drink that contained herbs and vitamins.
Elements such as ginseng, ginkgo biloba, and echinacea
that were said to have therapeutic benefits on the mind,
body, and spirit were added to our formulation. We
thought our audience would quickly recognize the
value of drinking a refreshing beverage that was also
good for them.
When reevaluating our marketing options, I hap-
pened to pick up an issue of Shape magazine that had
an article on how yohimbe, arginine, and carnitine
could spice up your sex life. This led to our Energy
drink that then led to Power, Wisdom, Drive, and Eros.
You get the picture. Applying them to our different fla-
vor and herb combinations offered us the marketing
opportunity to make a strong product–benefit story.
NEJE: How long did it take for you to recreate your-
selves?
Bello: Nine months. Nine harrowing and very tense
months. However by November 1996 we were finally
ready to relaunch the brand. We decided on a strong fla-
vor profile, a new graphic look, and a font we took from
the movie Braveheart. It just seemed to fit with the image
we were trying to create.
We went to the bottlers and produced 25,000 cases of
the product. Our distributor hit the market in New
Hampshire and the SoBe concept exploded. The product
flew off the shelves. I mean, it just blew out everyone’s
expectations about what the product would do.
We went to the InterBev Trade Show soon after and a
Snapple distributor discovered us and offered to help us
expand the line. Word was getting around the country
that we had a winner and everyone wanted to get in on
the action. I knew the more publicity we got, the better we
could launch SoBe, so I became the “Lizard King” and
worked the public relations angle every chance I could.
We did everything we could think of to create a “buzz”
factor. We used a fleet of decorated “Lizard Love Buses”
to sample the product and create an image for SoBe that
soon everyone was trying to copy. The buzz got louder
and louder and the trade listened. We expanded distribu-
tion rapidly, spending more money than we had, but
“carpe diem.” We sampled like everywhere. We, my team
including me, went into every retail outlet we could find
to talk to the owners and get them to take on our line. If
we met resistance, we would give them a couple of free
cases, tell them to stock the product in the refrigerated
case area, and see what happened. We would not take
“no” for an answer. There was always a way to get to
“yes” and that’s what we needed. Lots of “yeses.”
We sought out hip, cool athletes to spread the word
about the brand and join “Team Lizard.”  John Daly, the
golfer, and Bode Miller, the ski jumper, were brought on
board to help us tell our story. A lot of folks thought we
were wrong to turn to John Daly because of some of his
past personal problems, but he was really fantastic for us.
John was very effective.
NEJE: Smooth sailing from that point on?
Bello: I only wish. We just couldn’t make enough of the
product from March to May 1997. I was on the road con-
stantly selling the concept while Tom was trying to hire
professional operational and logistics people. It was chaot-
ic. Keeping up with orders was a nightmare.
We were selling health and energy and that combina-
tion was a winner. We had a product with no preservatives
and no phosphates. We were different. Different with our
packaging, different with our formulation, our brand
name, heck even our bottle top was different because we
put funny sayings on each one; people even started to col-
lect the bottle tops to show their friends.
NEJE: Besides having to catch up with demand, what
other problems did you have?
Bello: Legal. We got sued by Arizona Teas in 1997 and
1998 for allegedly infringing on their packaging and bot-
tling design. That distracted us but we eventually won
the lawsuits.
NEJE: When did you know you had “arrived?”
Bello: Easy. Beverage companies started to mimic us.
Wannabes. Lots of them. They were coming out with “me-
too” products that ripped off our concept.
NEJE: What did you do about it?
Bello: We kept innovating, being the best, working, and
selling. We owned the concept, and in life, if you are not
the “lizard,” you are the loser. America is a good place for
winners. It’s a free country and our competition was enti-
tled to try to catch up to us. That’s why we had to stay
nimble and never take anything for granted. That’s the
big difference between a large corporation and a start-up
like we were. Innovate or die. 
We had to stay one step ahead of everyone else. It’s
really all about leadership. To inspire our sales force, I had
to be in the trenches with them. They had to take their
inspiration from me. They saw how I never took “no” for
an answer. I’d fly off any time, to any place, for any rea-
son that could take our brand further. There were no lim-
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its. Growth, in terms of sales and distribution outlets, was
my driving force. We had a lot of sales contests with
“Lizard Leaders” winning great awards. We also had our
“Lizard Laggards”; those folks either turned things
around or they were dropped. Be good or be gone.
I made sure to listen to people everywhere I went.
Wholesalers, retailers, our salespeople, customers, you
name it. I listened, and I listened hard. I never felt I had
all the answers. There were always bright, insightful peo-
ple along the way who added enormously to our success.
You just have to know how to listen.
NEJE: Why sell out to PepsiCo? Why not continue to ride
the wave?
Bello: There were a couple of reasons. First, as an inde-
pendent beverage company, it’s hard to keep growing
without the marketing muscle of a large corporation. We
had gone as far and as fast as I thought we could go with-
out someone like Pepsi behind us.
Second, we wanted to take our chips off the table. We
had worked exhaustively for five, six years, once we
reformulated the brand, and we were tired. It was time to
rest up some and enjoy being rich.
NEJE: Your busy offices here in Norwalk, Connecticut,
suggest you haven’t retired.
Bello: No, I ain’t done yet. Only now it’s a hobby. I am
working on a new food line that we are going to call the
“Firefighter” brand with colleagues from my NFL and
SoBe days. As a social venture, it will benefit Firefighters.
Think of chili, snack chips, coffee, and maybe even a
“Firefighter” line of clothing. There’s also a beverage line
being developed, someone else is working on that as an
independent company.
After 9/11, I was inspired by the heroism of New
York’s firefighters. I’ve always admired Paul Newman,
who has developed some very good consumer products;
then his company donates the profits to charity. That’s
sort of what we’re going to do. We’re going to donate 25
percent of our net profits to firefighter causes. We’ve got
national, as well as some local, firefighter associations
already lined up behind us. The products will be “haz-
ardous material free.” No high fructose, transfats, fewer
calories, and generally better-for-you fun food. We are
working with a firefighter to be one of our chefs.
NEJE: You’re only 58 years old so I know you have lots of
energy left, but why take on the strain of launching
another product nationwide?  Why not something less
ambitious?
Bello: Because I don’t want to say someday I “could have,
would have, should have” done this or that. Life is good
and it is as good as you want to make it. It’s about making
a little money and having lots of fun. Any one can do it.
Being involved in new product development, working
with wonderful people, and seeing my concepts succeed in
the marketplace makes me smile. I started off, like so many
Americans, in a small town (Plainville, Connecticut). I’m
proud of what we did in Vietnam, at the NFL, with SoBe,
and I’m ready to follow that up with something exciting,
new, and different.
—L.W.
10 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
10
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 7 [2004], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol7/iss1/1
Stephen Heard graduated from the University of RhodeIsland in 1970 with a degree in business administra-tion. He started his career by signing up as a manage-
ment trainee at Woolworth’s Department Store in Wellesley,
Massachusetts. It didn’t take him long to realize he missed
his calling: being by the Rhode Island shoreline and
employed in the fishing industry. Nearly 35 years later,
Stephen is a self-made multimillionaire, having followed
both his passion for entrepreneurship and for living his life
on the Atlantic coast.
NEJE: Seems like you’ve had quite a successful financial
ride here in beautiful, scenic Rhode Island.
Heard: Please don’t make it sound like it was easy, or like
it was some rags-to-riches story. My father was a Harvard
graduate and never did like the fact that I left
Woolworth’s to go back to the fish business.
NEJE: Why did you?
Heard:  I’ve always loved the Rhode Island coastline and
I guess the fishing business was in my blood. I worked
summers during college in the Wickford Shellfish market
where they wholesaled lobsters and hard-shelled clams; it
was one of the few seafood markets around here in the
1960s. I put in long hours, but I loved working with the
fishermen so the time spent there never bothered me. The
folks who depended on the sea for their livelihood were
an independent lot, proud men all, and it certainly wasn’t
an easy life. Yet many of them hung in there and did well.
These days, it’s much more difficult to make your living
from the sea.
I wasn’t cut out to be a lobsterman, but I did the next
best thing. I quit Woolworth’s rather than have the
company resettle my family in western Massachusetts
working in one of its stores. It would have meant being
even further away from the ocean, so I went back to
Wickford.
NEJE: Same company, different job?
Heard: Yes, exactly. As a college graduate, I was given a
manager’s position, which only means I became responsi-
ble for just about everything getting done and wasn’t paid
overtime. Summers were unbelievably hectic with a peak
of 25 employees; winters slowed down some, so we only
had 15 employees during the colder months.
NEJE: Somewhere along the line, you went from manager
to owner. Few people get rich working for someone else.
Heard: Well, the getting rich part—and it’s debatable if
that’s what I am because I think of myself as comfortable,
not rich—certainly didn’t happen right away. I had gone
to work for Jack McGeough, who bought the Wickford
fish market operation in 1968 when it was still pretty
much a mom-and-pop operation. Jack really built up the
business; he was the hardest workingman I’d ever
known, putting in 80- to 100-hour weeks on a consistent
basis.
Jack taught me a lot. He wasn’t always the nicest per-
son to work for, but I saw how he reinvested his money in
the business and was singularly focused on expanding
the company’s physical plant. There were other fish
wholesalers up and down the coastline and things were
pretty competitive. Fishermen might like dealing with
you because they felt they could trust you or there was
mutual respect. But they had a family to feed too, so if
someone else was paying better than we were for their
catch, well, they’d take their business elsewhere. We con-
stantly had to be on our toes. We had to know what was
going on every minute of every day, constantly monitor-
ing the fish business because it changed daily.
NEJE: How did you get your shot at running things?
Heard: After six years of working for Jack, he decided to
sell the business to the Prelude Company out of Westport,
Massachusetts. Prelude had built up a considerable off-
shore lobster fleet and they began to acquire four to five
wholesale seafood companies in order to integrate their
operations vertically. It seemed to be a sound business
strategy, but I guess they tried to grow too quickly and
ran out of cash. They went bankrupt in 1978.
I was employed at another seafood wholesaler when
all this transpired. I approached two people, one an old
friend of mine and another a coworker, about buying the
Wickford operation; they agreed to go to bankruptcy
court with me and try to buy it. Everything had been





et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring 2004
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2004
closed up for six months and things were pretty well neg-
lected at the place, but we knew the facility was well built
and we felt we could run the operation properly.
NEJE: How did you raise the capital?
Heard: Pretty standard stuff. We pledged our homes
and approached the Small Business Association to guar-
antee a business loan through our local bank. We raised
the incredible sum (back then) of $350,000. We paid the
bankruptcy court $210,000 for the property and that left
us with $140,000 in working capital. It may seem like a
lot of money to hold aside to start up the business, but
we knew the reality of the marketplace. Fishermen were
paid in cash, either daily if they wanted it, or weekly.
The restaurants we were wholesaling the food to in
Providence, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia didn’t
settle their accounts for 50 to 60 days. In a way, as a
wholesaler, we were everyone’s banker as well.
Not all of our business was wholesale, just most of it.
Twenty percent was retail to local individuals. That was a
nice cash business. (See company advertisement, page
14.)
We opened for business in June 1979. The first six to
twelve months, we hardly took any money out of the
business. We each got a small salary; we were all
depending on our wives to work and carry our families.
My wife, Darlene, was working for the phone company
and she was the breadwinner. She didn’t mind that at all
since she had always believed in me and knew I wanted
to be my own boss all along.
NEJE: Did you change the name of the company to some-
thing memorable like Heard & Company?
Heard: No, we retained the same name, Wickford
Shellfish Company, because the operation had been
around for some 40 to 50 years so everyone around the
Wickford–North Kingstown area already knew about it.
The smartest move we made at the beginning was to
reject an offer by the Old Stone Bank, when it initially
gave us the start-up money, to take on a variable or float-
ing rate loan. We wanted to know exactly what our
monthly borrowing costs would be so we committed to a
9.5 percent interest rate. Within two years, interest rates
had skyrocketed to 16 percent or higher under the Carter
administration. If we had gone with the variable rate offer
we might not have survived.
NEJE: Partnerships can be tricky. Apparently your expe-
rience was very positive.
Heard: I’d say so! I was around 30 but my two partners
were in their early 40s so they had more experience than I
did. That really helped. We were all friends and knew
each other socially before starting the business together.
We agreed to split up assignments so each of us could
take a piece of the operation that related best to our strong
points. I handled wholesale accounts, another partner
took the retail piece and scheduled the employee shifts,
and my second partner took over the administrative
chores. We avoided mistakes that other partnerships have
made by communicating openly, trusting each other, and
working huge hours—usually 80 to 90 hours a week.
That’s about 15-hour days if you figure each of us took a
day off during the week.
It meant sacrificing time at home, and Darlene for a
while told me she was concerned that I had become a
slave to the business. I was never home during the sum-
mer months, that’s for sure. It was our busiest time and it
was essential all three of us put in the hours required to
make our operation successful. Over the years, we bought
a couple of vacation homes but we eventually sold them
because we never had time as a family to use them. I was
just too busy.
NEJE: Any other bumps along the way?
Heard: Actually, no. The company always showed a prof-
it so finances were never a big issue. Our fish operation
became known as a good payer so our reputation grew
and grew. It was exhausting work, but it paid off. After
about six years of this intense effort, a local businessman
who owned a home heating oil operation was looking to
diversify, so he offered to buy us out.
Negotiations dragged on for some six to nine months
and our prospective buyer threatened to walk away and
buy another fish business. However, that deal fell
through so he came back to us and sweetened his offer.
We sold him the business for more than $1 million, which
seemed like a fortune back in 1984. We had built up the
seafood operation from zero to more than $5 million in
yearly revenues with our own trucks leaving every night
to New York City, New Jersey, or Philadelphia. We really
accomplished something!
NEJE: So this meant early retirement for you?
Heard: Hardly. While my partners and I built up the
Wickford site, we had purchased three more wholesale
seafood businesses in Wickford, Tiverton, and Warwick.
As a group, we started the Tiverton Shellfish Company.
This operation, along with Warwick Cove Shellfish, was
one of the largest clam dealers in Rhode Island.
We were constantly looking to expand our revenue
base, whether through internal growth or through acqui-
sitions. However, we always insisted that any business
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we purchased had to include owning real estate. Since we
knew we weren’t going to be in business forever, we
believed that holding a hard asset like real estate, espe-
cially waterfront property, would be a good investment.
And we never had to borrow money again through the
SBA. We only acquired other companies if we could fund
it internally.
So “retirement” meant I only had to take care of three
businesses. However, since we had added a new partner
during one of our acquisitions, instead of working six
days a week, I now only worked three days per week.
Eventually, one of my original partners decided he had
had enough of the fish business and left for Florida. The
second original partner stepped away from day-to-day
operations to manage his own lobster boats.
NEJE: So by the late 1980s, you had three wholesale
clam operations keeping you busy part of the time.
Apparently, we’re not finished with your entrepreneurial
endeavors.
Heard: Right you are. I wasn’t really happy being just in
my late-30s and working part-time. My wife and I had
purchased a number of investment properties around the
area, but these weren’t keeping me very busy either. So,
when Jimmy Champlin wanted to retire and sell his
wholesale seafood business along with his well-known
restaurant in Galilee, about 20 minutes driving time from
Wickford, I was immediately interested. 
NEJE: Let’s see if I understand this correctly. You made
money selling your first business, had interests in three
others, owned investment properties around the town of
Wickford, and you still had the motivation to throw
yourself into an even bigger venture?
Heard: Yes, but think of it this way: As an entrepreneur, I
had no 401(k) plan, no IRAs, no safety net at all. So buy-
ing rental properties and buying or selling businesses
became my only way to put together enough money for
my daughters’ college educations and for the future. In no
way did I have enough money to retire on before I bought
into Champlin’s.
NEJE: Did you have the funding to buy Champlin’s your-
self?
Heard: Not even close. With two of the original partners
and a third who had been part of the Warwick Cove
operation, we put together an offer for Champlin’s and
Jimmy Champlin accepted it. We sold two of our three
small clam operations and put everything we had into
the business. Jimmy held most of the financing. We paid
him $1 million for his business but only had to provide
$200,000 in cash since he was willing to hold a 20-year
note for $800,000. Then the three of us ponied up an
additional $250,000 in working capital and we were on
our way. 
We made sure we kept the restaurant manager as our
key employee since none of us had been in the restaurant
business before this. He was young and very talented—
exactly what we needed to help us learn the front-end
operation. We opened officially in March 1990 but we
worked in the business for three months before it changed
hands so we could introduce ourselves to the fishermen
and to the retail customers. Consistency of service was
critical to getting a running start. 
The restaurant’s location was ideal. Even though it’s
pretty much a seasonal business, running from Memorial
Day through to Columbus Day, we had a waterfront loca-
tion and we were near the ferry terminal to Block Island.
We knew we could stay open from November to April
and still draw some business.
NEJE: We wouldn’t be surprised to learn that you grew
Champlin’s business as well.
Heard: You bet we did. In the 10 years I co-owned
Champlin’s, we expanded from seating 60 customers to
up around 300. We expanded the inside tables by remov-
ing some office space and then built an outside deck with
a canopy that can seat 150 customers during warmer
weather. Maybe we didn’t know much about how to run
a restaurant when we started out, but we all figured it
would have to work if we just offered the best, freshest
seafood people could eat at reasonable prices.
Business boomed. We served upwards of 1,200 meals a
day using only window service. We didn’t employ wait-
people. My two daughters were the “deck kids” who
cleaned up after the customers were finished with their
meals. Our wives worked on the cash registers or in the
kitchen.
NEJE: How did you convince your wife to work in the
business?
Heard: Oh, that was easy. If Darlene wanted to see me,
she had to work at Champlin’s! We had no real summer
vacations since it was all taken up with work. In fact, now
that I’ve just sold my interest in Champlin’s to my other
partners, this coming summer will be the first one in 35
years I will be able to enjoy just being out on my boat.
NEJE: Why did you decide to cash out?
Heard: It was time for me to slow down. I was getting
burned out and I could see my other partners were too.
They were cutting back their hours and I saw that as the
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handwriting on the wall. Working seven days a week was
a real killer. Plus, there were too many kids in the next
generation for all of them to work in the restaurant; some-
one had to bow out. Finally, I couldn’t see my legacy as
getting my daughters involved in something that would
require 70 to 80 hours of commitment a week. It didn’t
seem fair.
I structured a five-year payout in 1999 with my part-
ners and I just received my last check from them. This
deal included selling my interest in a retail seafood mar-
ket in Wickford we had purchased together in 1996 and
renamed  “Champlin’s of Wickford.”  We traded in on the
Champlin brand name and got immediate customer cred-
ibility.
NEJE: What were the negotiations like? Things can get
pretty sticky with evaluating the value of a business
operation among partners.
Heard: I know it can, but remember, I’ve had a close
personal relationship with all my partners. We were
truly friends and still are today. We came up separate-
ly with our sense of what the business was worth and
the numbers were pretty close. We had an accountant
to offer advice, but it all came down to a handshake. In
all the years I’ve been in business, we have never had
anything written down. No contracts, no partnership
agreements.
NEJE: Since you’re vibrant and still shy of 60, what
comes next?
Heard: Well, I’ve been thinking that over. I’m itching to get
back into some type of entrepreneurial activity. I only know
the seafood business, so I imagine it would be related in
some way to that and I know I want to involve my daugh-
ters and no one else. I love owning real estate and I’ve
learned waterfront property beats owning anything else.
I know there are downsides. The rules and regulations
you have to follow as a small business owner today are
quite complex and can be expensive. Worker’s compensa-
tion and health insurance premiums are going through
the roof and the state government of Rhode Island has
barely reacted to this crisis. It seems everyone has a hand
in your pocket even before you open your doors and find-
ing people who are willing to work hard has become a
daunting challenge.
Yet I find the entrepreneurial life a great way to live. At
the end of the day when you’re bone tired, it’s just great
to see a full cash register and remember the long lines of
customers waiting patiently to give you their money in
exchange for an honest product. I didn’t see my daugh-
ters much when they were growing up. If we go into busi-
ness together, it will give me another chance to do things
better and spend more time with them. Life goes awfully
quickly.
—L.W.
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We examined the relationship between employee equitycompensation, incentive compensation, and firmgrowth using a sample of 480 privately held firms
from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation’s database of
Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year (EOY) winners.
Using frameworks from agency and motivation theories, we
argued that larger percentages of both equity- and incentive-
based compensation allocated to top managers and employees
would be associated with firm growth. After controlling for firm
and industry effects, the results of the study showed that while
the firms in the sample preferred providing incentive compensa-
tion, providing equity compensation for employees was a posi-
tively significant predictor of firm growth over a three-year peri-
od. These findings suggest that prescriptions for growth in larg-
er firms developed from agency theory also may be applicable to
entrepreneurial firms, and founder/CEOs seeking to grow their
firms should consider using equity compensation to motivate
their current employees and to attract new ones.
While financing growth has long been an area of intrigue
in entrepreneurship research (Brophy 1997; Mason and
Hamilton 2000), compensation of the employees who
assist the entrepreneur in achieving this growth remains a
virtually unresearched field (Heneman, Tansky, and Camp
2000). In one of the original studies of the successful man-
agement of rapid growth, Hambrick and Crozier (1985)
found that successfully growing firms provided their
employees with some sort of stake in the outcome of the
firm. However, this study was done before offering stock
or stock options to people in levels below senior manage-
ment became commonplace (Kambil, Eselius, and
Monteiro 2000), and most of the research in equity-based
compensation has continued to focus on senior managers
in relatively large firms (Rajagopalan 1997; Zahra,
Neubaum, and Huse 2000). 
Research in equity and incentive compensation issues is
relevant for entrepreneurial firms for several reasons.
First, funding in entrepreneurship research has historical-
ly focused on venture capital financing (Amit, Brander,
and Zott 2000). However, most entrepreneurial firms do
not seek venture capital (Bhide 1992; Brophy, 1997). This
suggests that these firms are obtaining financing by other
means, but as of yet it is not clear how those alternative
financing arrangements are structured (Mason and
Hamilton 2000). Since most growth-oriented firms are pri-
vately held companies, the study of the role of equity-
based compensation, incentive compensation, and firm
growth has been somewhat limited. Secondly, recruitment
and retention of talent is critical for entrepreneurial firms
(Brush, Greene, and Hart 2001). Determining whether
equity positions, incentive compensation, or a combina-
tion of these approaches is most appropriate would great-
ly assist entrepreneurs in their efforts to recruit and retain
top performers for their firms. Lastly, employee motiva-
tion both to stay and to perform is important for the entre-
preneurial firm to manage costs, stabilize the organization,
and provide organizational legitimacy (Cooper and Folta
2000; Greiner 1998; Reynolds 1987). These observations
raise several questions pertaining to equity and incentive
compensation in the entrepreneurial firm. Some of these
questions include: What is the relationship between own-
ership, incentive compensation and firm growth? Is equi-
ty- or incentive-based compensation a better predictor of
firm growth? How is ownership and incentive compensa-
tion distributed among entrepreneurial firms? In this arti-
cle we report the results of a study suggesting that while
the leadership of entrepreneurial firms may have a prefer-
ence for providing incentive compensation, equity com-
pensation may in fact be more strongly associated with
firm growth. 
The remainder of this article is divided into four sec-
tions. First, we will review some literature on ownership
allocations within an agency framework and use this liter-
ature to develop hypotheses of firm ownership allocations
and growth in entrepreneurial firms. Next, we review lit-
erature on incentive compensation and trace its roots in
motivation theory. From this discussion, we develop
hypotheses of incentive compensation and firm growth.
The next section describes the results of the tests of these
hypotheses using a sample of privately held entrepreneur-
ial firms from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation’s
database of Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year
(EOY) winners. The article concludes with a discussion of
Employee Equity, Incentive Compensation, and 
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the findings and some potential implications for both
managers and researchers on employee incentives and
growth in entrepreneurial firms. 
Agency Theory and Ownership in
Entrepreneurial Firms
Ownership issues in growth-oriented firms have not
received significant research attention, largely because it
has been an implicit assumption that the founder/CEO
and/or their family members control most if not all of the
firm’s equity (Kelly and Hay 2000; Markman, Balkin, and
Schjoedt 2001). Historically, research of ownership posi-
tions and firm performance have focused on publicly held
firms and those about to go public via an IPO (Certo et al.
2003; Dalton et al. 2003). Therefore, ownership-perform-
ance relationships in privately held or closely held
growth-oriented firms have not been a focus of this
research stream. While this is likely the case with lifestyle
firms (Bento and White 2001), the literature on teams and
IPOs suggest that this assumption may not be accurate
when considering the growth-oriented firm. Since the
strategies, organization structures, and perceptions of
growth-oriented firms are more likely to resemble those of
firms undergoing IPOs than those of lifestyle firms
(Cooper and Daily 1997; Sexton and Bowman-Upton 1991;
Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan 1993), these literatures may
be a good source of information for theorizing about own-
ership structures in entrepreneurial firms. 
One of the most prominent characteristics associated
with successfully seeking outside funding is the quality of
a firm’s management team (Birley and Stockley 2000;
MacMillan, Siegel, and SubbaNarashima 1985). Indeed,
the idea that a management team rather than a single
entrepreneur typically promotes firm growth is common
in the entrepreneurship literature (Cooper and Bruno
1977; Cooper and Daily 1997; Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven 1990), and recent research suggests that an
owner-controlled privately held firm with multiple man-
agement layers is more efficient than an owner-controlled
firm with a flat organizational structure or an agent-led
firm of either management structure (Durand and Vargas
2003). Some reasons for this thinking are the ability to
exert greater effort, reduced reliance on a single person,
complementary skills and knowledge, the lead entrepre-
neur’s ability to attract and manage people, and/or as an
initial check of the soundness of the venture idea (Cooper
and Daily 1997; Vesper 1990). 
Therefore, if the caliber of the management team is a
significant factor in firm growth, what is the most effec-
tive way to keep a good team together? Insights from
agency theory provide some useful ideas. While agency
theory has typically been used to explain behavior and
ownership structures in large firms (Barkema and
Gomez-Mejia 1998; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Stroh 1996), its use is becoming more
common in research of smaller and privately held firms
(Durand and Vargas 2003; Zahra et al. 2000) and
researchers have recently called for additional study of
principal-agent relationships in entrepreneurial settings
(Manigart and Sapienza 2000).
In the context of entrepreneurship research, principal-
agent issues are particularly relevant when studying
growing firms with a lead entrepreneur as CEO (Hitt,
Ireland, and Hoskisson 2001). One of the primary chal-
lenges of the entrepreneur of the growth-oriented firm is
to establish organizational legitimacy (Deephouse 1996;
Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). One way to gain legitima-
cy is to build a balanced team of professionals with
industry experience (Hambrick and Crozier 1985; Siegel
et al. 1993). Attracting and retaining talent has always
been a challenge for growth-oriented firms (Fombrun
and Wally 1989; Hambrick and Crozier 1985; Heneman
et al. 2000). This suggests that talented managers and
employees in growth-oriented firms further develop
their relatively unique set of talents and abilities
(Castanias and Helfat 2001) and are seen as attractive
assets to the firm. As a result, the entrepreneur must
seek ways to limit managerial opportunism (Moran and
Ghoshal 1996; Williamson 1993), which in this context
would likely mean that the manager might leverage his
or her firm knowledge and/or position to gain a posi-
tion with another firm or even start his or her own firm
(Autio 2000; Cooper and Folta 2000). A possible solution
to this problem may be to reduce the tensions inherent in
the principal-agent relationship by providing ownership
opportunities to the firm’s managers, and by extension
to its employees (Case 1995; Himmelberg, Hubbard, and
Palia 1999). Equity-based compensation has been used to
promote entrepreneurial behavior in larger firms (Block
and Ornati 1987; Ireland, Kuratko, and Hornsby 2001;
Sykes 1992). In addition to making it easier to attract
executive and professional level talent (Hambrick and
Crozier 1985), this approach also could be attractive to
the owners of the growth-oriented firm because it would
be comparatively inexpensive to monitor, thereby reduc-
ing agency costs (Banker et al. 1996) which is important
since cash is typically scarce in growth-oriented firms
(Reynolds 1987). These points are reflected in the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
H1: Equity ownership by employees will be
positively associated with growth in entrepre-
neurial firms.
16 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
16
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 7 [2004], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol7/iss1/1
Incentive Compensation and Motivation
Theory in Entrepreneurial Firms
While broadening ownership may reduce agency costs
and encourage employees to think like owners, many
entrepreneurs find the thought of relinquishing control of
their firm unattractive (Cable and Shane 1997;
Greenberger and Sexton 1988; Kelly and Hay 2000;
Markman et al. 2001). Therefore, entrepreneurs may prefer
to try to motivate the employees of the firm through non-
equity-based incentive compensation (bonuses, profit
sharing, etc). The rationale for incentive compensation is
rooted in the expectancy theory of motivation (Vroom
1964). According to expectancy theory, motivation will be
high when employees believe that their efforts will lead to
high performance (expectancy), and that high perform-
ance will result in the attainment of particular outcomes
(instrumentality) and these outcomes are desired by the
employees (valence). The idea of incentive compensation
is based on the assumption that the opportunity for
increased compensation or benefits will motivate employ-
ees to raise or maintain their efforts to perform at a high
level. 
Like many areas of human resources research in small-
er firms, incentive compensation is a relatively neglected
topic (Heneman et al. 2000; Katz et al. 2000). This is
because research on the relationship between pay and firm
growth has again typically focused on senior management
in relatively large firms (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1987;
1990; Barkema 1996; Boyd and Salamin 2001; Rajagopalan
1997). This research suggests that incentive pay is com-
monly used by firms that wish to encourage the identifica-
tion and pursuit of growth opportunities (Balkin and
Gomez-Mejia 1990; Boyd and Salamin 2001) and may be
more of a motivator for pursuing growth strategies than
equity-based compensation (Barkema 1996). A possible
explanation for this is that employees may feel that receiv-
ing rewards from incentive-based compensation is less
risky than equity-based compensation in the growing firm
(Beatty and Zajac 1994). 
In studies of nonsenior employees, incentive compensa-
tion has been found to be associated with lower turnover,
higher productivity, and enhanced performance in larger
firms, especially when combined with training (Delaney
and Huselid 1996). These findings are also somewhat sup-
ported by the few studies of incentive compensation in
smaller firms. Welbourne and Andrews (1996) found that
incentive compensation programs were negatively associ-
ated with IPO stock prices, but positively associated with
five-year survival rates. Chandler and McEvoy (2000)
found that incentive compensation did not predict firm
profitability but was a moderator of TQM implementation
effectiveness. Collectively, this literature suggests the fol-
lowing hypothesis: 
H2: Incentive compensation for employees will




Entrepreneurship research has historically been hin-
dered because of the relative lack of large, robust data-
bases containing financial performance data for entre-
preneurial ventures (Landstrom and Sexton 2000). This
is largely due to the fact that these firms are typically
privately held and therefore not required to release
financial information. To help address this difficulty, the
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation has devoted sub-
stantial time and money to the development of large
sample databases that include financial data for entre-
preneurial firms. Because of these efforts, the 1998 Ernst
& Young Entrepreneur Of The Year Institute (EOYI)
database, codeveloped by the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation and Ernst & Young, is used for the sample
for this study. The firms in this database were finalists in
the Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year award com-
petition. EOYI members are CEOs (primarily founders)
from arguably the most innovative and admired firms in
the world. They represent the “best of the best” in terms
of their contribution to growth, profitability, job cre-
ation, and economic impact.
Specific details of the development of the EOYI data-
base have been described by Cox, Ensley, and Camp
(2003). The EOYI database contains information on own-
ership structure, compensation policies, human resource
practices, and performance on 596 firms. These firms
averaged $100 million in sales during 1997, ranging from
less than $1 million to more than $7 billion. Average
annual sales growth rates for the sample ranged from
less than 5 percent to more than 110 percent. The data-
base is comprised primarily of firms in the manufactur-
ing, service, and wholesale trades. When compared to
the Longitudinal Establishment and Enterprise
Microdata database maintained by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census, the EOY database contains comparatively
larger firms, but is fairly representative of the distribu-
tion of firms in the United States. Considering that the
database consists of firms considered to be outstanding,
the size and performance differences between them and
the general population should not be surprising. This
study focused on the 480 privately held firms in the
database.
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Measures
Dependent Variables. It has been argued that profitabil-
ity-based measures may not be appropriate measures for
privately held firm performance because owners may shift
business profit and personal income in ways to minimize
their total tax liability (Hulse and Pope 1996). Also, while
profitability-based measures of performance work well for
larger firms with older assets in place, they are influenced
by historical costs and may not capture the value of
younger firms since smaller firms comprise a dispropor-
tionate number of new ventures (Keasey and Watson 1993;
Smith and Watts 1992). Conversely, there is a substantial
history of using variables such as growth in sales and/or
employees as a performance measure in studies of private-
ly held, growth-oriented firms due in part to the fact that
these variables are not subject to the age- and tax-related
limitations of profitability-related measures (Davidsson
and Wicklund 2000). Therefore, sales and employee
growth from 1995 through 1998 were used as the depend-
ent variables in this study (Baum, Locke, and Smith 2001;
Bento and White 2001). Three- to five-year time periods as
measures of performance and/or growth have often been
used in previous entrepreneurship research (Brush and
VanderWerf 1992; Davidsson 1991; Robinson and
McDougall 1998). 
Predictor Variables. Since approximately 55 percent
(260 of 480) of the firms in the sample had no employees
who owned any equity in their respective firm, we created
a dummy variable where: 1 = some equity ownership by
employees and 0 = no equity ownership by employees.
Since almost 99 percent (475 of 480) of the firms in the sam-
ple offered some sort of incentive compensation to their
employees, we measured incentive compensation as the
percentage of the firm’s total incentive compensation allo-
cated to the firm’s top managers and all other employees
respectively. 
Control Variables. To account for conditions at the
beginning of the study period, firm age in 1999 (Chandler
and Hanks 1994; Kazanjian and Drazin 1990) and the
amount of 1995 sales and the number of employees in 1995
were included as control variables (Davidsson and
Wicklund 2000). To control for potential leadership
changes, we measured CEO tenure as the number of years
the CEO had held the position. We also used several firm-
and industry level variables, measuring them as a percent-
age of total firm sales. We used total compensation
expense to control for varying degrees of labor intensive-
ness v. capital intensiveness across both firm and industry
settings. We included the firm’s international sales since
internationalization has been shown to be a predictor of
sales growth in small and/or privately held firms
(Bloodgood, Sapienza, and Almedia 1996; Burgel, Fier,
Licht, and Murray 2000). For industry-level effects, we
used R&D expense and sales and marketing expense to
control for the relative importance of basic research and
promotional intensity across industries (Dowling and
McGee 1994; Mizik and Jacobson 2003). 
Results
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables
in this study. It shows that the firms in the sample experi-
enced substantial growth in sales during the study period.
On average, sales and employees increased by 76 and 66
percent, respectively, from 1995 to 1998. Most of the firms’
incentive compensation goes to top managers (47.49%),
with all other employees receiving 30.36 percent of total
incentive compensation. While there are several statistical-
ly significant correlations, there are only 15 that are greater
than .3, and almost all of these are between the dependent
variables and/or the control variables. 
Table 2 reports the results of regressions of the control
and predictor variables on sales and employee growth. We
will use this information to test our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that equity compensation would
be associated with firm growth. This hypothesis is sup-
ported. Equity compensation given to employees was a
significantly positive predictor of both sales and employee
growth (p<.1). Hypothesis 2 predicted that incentive com-
pensation for employees would be associated with firm
growth. None of the measures of incentive compensation
were significantly associated with either sales or employ-
ee growth. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported.
Of the control variables, the number of employees (p<.001)
at the start of the study period positively predicted both
measures of growth, while CEO tenure negatively predict-
ed both measures of growth (p<.05 for sales, p<.1 for
employees). Sales at the beginning of the period predicted
sales growth (p<.001). Interestingly, total compensation
expense was a negative predictor of sales growth (p<.05)
but positively predicted employee growth (p<.01). Firm
age (p<.001) and internationalization (p<.1) were negative
predictors of sales growth.
Discussion
This study has helped address recent calls for further
investigation of agency effects in smaller and/or privately
held firms (Durand and Vargas 2003; Manigart and
Sapienza 2000; Zahra et al. 2000). Using our sample of
entrepreneurial firms, we found that CEO/entrepreneurs
prefer to provide incentive compensation rather than equi-
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ty compensation for senior management and other
employees. However, only equity-based compensation
was significantly associated with firm growth. This find-
ing suggests that CEO/entrepreneurs may be maintaining
control of their firms at the price of sustained growth, and
by extension, reducing their opportunities to create
wealth. We will now provide some possible explanations
for our findings. 
One possible explanation is the relative age of firms in
the sample. The average age was just over 19 years. So
while they were not new ventures (Brush and VanderWerf
1992; Robinson 1999), their equity and compensation pat-
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terns may still be reflective of conditions at the start of the
business (Boeker 1989; Brush and Chaganti 1998). Because
of this still relatively young age, these firms may not have
experienced the organizational crises where others in the
organization beyond the founder/CEO need to be given
more ownership for the firm to continue to survive and
grow (Greiner 1998). However, the age of the firms in the
sample does suggest that these firms were not “born to go
public,” which may indicate that the firms that provide
employee equity are not doing it so that employees can
cash out their positions in a future public offering. 
Resource-based theory may also provide some explana-
tions for these findings. Resource-based theory suggests
that firm resources and capabilities are socially complex
(Alvarez and Busenitz 2001) and relatively immobile
across firms (Barney 2001). If this is the case, the entrepre-
neur/CEO’s concerns about key people leaving the firm
are minimized because their skills and knowledge are con-
text-specific. Therefore, these sets of knowledge and skills
are both able to be retained by the rebundling of the firm’s
remaining knowledge, resources, and capabilities and not
be directly or completely transferable to other firms (Grant
1996). However, the findings are consistent with recent
research of larger firms which suggests that managers who
hold equity positions in the firm will place a greater
emphasis on internally generated innovation (Hoskisson
et al. 2002). Therefore, CEOs may be offering the equity as
a means to fuel the firm’s innovation and subsequent
growth. 
Explanations for the nonsignificance of incentive com-
pensation allocations and growth are not as clearly evi-
dent. However, a possible explanation might be found in
how compensation is perceived in growing firms. While
compensation is viewed in monetary terms, there is some
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evidence that benefits such as opportunities to do interest-
ing, meaningful work, learn new information and skills,
work with enjoyable and stimulating colleagues, and seek
work-life balance are also viewed as compensation by
employees of growth-oriented firms (Heneman et al.
2000). Therefore, the opportunity to have a voice in deter-
mining the future direction of the firm that an equity posi-
tion provides may be a reasonable part of a compensation
package in such a setting.
These findings certainly counter the contention that
founder/CEOs are the sole drivers of growth-oriented
firms. Recent research suggests that CEO motivation, tech-
nical and industry skills, and strategy selection significant-
ly influence firm growth even when other organizational
and environmental characteristics are accounted for
(Baum et al. 2001) and that the venture’s success hinges
largely upon the entrepreneur’s ability to the communi-
cate the firm’s story in ways that attract resources and
credibility to the firm (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). With
that much riding on the entrepreneur’s shoulders, it is
understandable why he or she may be hesitant to relin-
quish control of the firm to others (Kelly and Hay 2000).
However, by encouraging employees to think like owners
through the granting of equity (Case 1995), the entrepre-
neur may help further develop the people of the firm to
take on greater responsibility of the day-to-day operations,
thereby allowing him or her to focus more on the firm’s
longer term strategic direction. 
As is the case with all studies, our findings must be
interpreted in light of our study’s limitations. One limita-
tion is that equity and incentive compensation positions
were measured at the end of the study period rather than
the beginning, which assumes they stayed the same dur-
ing the entire period. A second limitation may be related to
the nature of the sample. While all firms in the sample
were considered by at least some to be outstanding, not all
firms in the sample were growing rapidly. This could indi-
cate that the number of firms offering employee equity in
this sample may not be representative of the general pop-
ulation. We heartily encourage other researchers to
address these concerns in future studies. 
Conclusions 
While these limitations certainly provide research oppor-
tunities, there also appear to be abundant opportunities
for future research in rewards structures in growth-orient-
ed firms. For instance, the fact that the presence of equity-
based employee compensation moderately predicted firm
performance runs counter to the conclusion of Dalton and
colleagues’ (2003) recent meta-analysis, which found no
relationship between employee equity positions and firm
performance. This could suggest that the employee equi-
ty-performance relationship is a phenomenon unique to
entrepreneurial firms. Another area for further research
could be on the role compensation plays in the develop-
ment of organizational capabilities. While the role of the
founder/CEO cannot be denied, at some point the organi-
zation needs to develop capabilities beyond those of the
CEO if continued growth occurs (Brush et al. 2001). An
interesting question might be whether equity or incentive
compensation is more effective in encouraging the devel-
opment of organizational capabilities (Chandler and
McEvoy 2000). 
Our study shows that equity-based compensation is
associated with growth in privately held entrepreneurial
firms. Therefore, we find it interesting that what
Hambrick and Crozier (1985) found to be true almost 20
years ago about the role of equity compensation and the
successful management of growth may still be true today.
Founders and/or CEOs of privately held firms that wish
to become more entrepreneurial would do well to heed
their advice. 
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This article focuses on "born globals" (Knight andCavusgil 1996) and interfirm resources to explain inter-national entrepreneurship. The theory posed here chal-
lenges the traditional image of international business as a long,
gradual process not occurring until later in the life cycle, and
applying only to large multinational corporations (MNCs).
Increasingly, new ventures must expand their operations
internationally early in their history in order to be competitive
(Oviatt and McDougall 1994), and require infrastructure (Van
de Ven 1993), or interfirm resources, for success. Specifically,
firms may rely on three factors to expand internationally: cost
factors, unique global resources, and networks.
Traditional theories of international business (IB) view the
global expansion of companies as a long, gradual process
not occurring until later in the life cycle, focus predomi-
nately on large multinational companies (MNCs) as
opposed to entrepreneurial start-ups, or focus on firm-spe-
cific ownership or internalization advantages. As a result,
theories explaining rapid internationalization, the interna-
tional expansion of entrepreneurial ventures, or advan-
tages arising from global networks, have been scarce.
Many traditional IB theories focus on how market
demand drives international expansion. For example,
some theories argue that entrepreneurs respond to local
market demand, then expand internationally when the
domestic market becomes saturated; that is, export is the
end, not the beginning of a typical market expansion path
(Linder 1961). Entrepreneurs are not likely to bear the nec-
essary costs of investigating overseas markets of unknown
dimensions and unknown promise (Vernon 1966).
Furthermore, internationalization theory argues that firms
expand into international markets slowly over time, ini-
tially entering markets that are most familiar (most simi-
lar) to the home market (Johanson and Vahlne 1977).
Further, the motivation for international expansion has
generally been viewed as stemming from firm-specific
ownership advantages, which can be extended to foreign
markets, and that are best internalized within the firm
because of transaction costs (Dunning 1988). However, the
increasing prevalence of networks, alliances, public goods,
and industry-wide standards has provided important
resources to clusters of firms, including entrepreneurial
start-ups. That is, many advantages are no longer firm
specific (Dunning 1995).
As a result, these traditional theories of international-
ization have received increasing criticism in recent years.
First, innovation and technical change (Posner 1961) have
long been recognized as major drivers of export behavior.
Many emerging high-technology industries increasingly
demonstrate the importance of this catalyst. Second, more
entrepreneurial ventures show substantial international
operations. Nowadays, increasingly firms must expand
their operations internationally early in their history in
order to be competitive (Oviatt and McDougall 1994).
Such firms have been labeled "instant internationals"
(Hordes, Clancy, and Baddaley 1995) or "born global"
(Knight  and Cavusgil 1996).
Similarly, Bell et al. (2003) found evidence of “born-
globals” as well as firms suddenly internationalizing after
a long period of focusing on the domestic market.
However, while traditional IB theories have not addressed
this phenomenon, entrepreneurship literature traditional-
ly has tended to focus on the creation and management of
SMEs within the domestic context (McDougall and Oviatt
2000). More recently, however, an intersection of comple-
mentary research paths, between international business
and entrepreneurship, has been increasingly evident
(Young, Pavlos, and Leo-Paul 2003; McDougall and Oviatt
2000). For example, Autio, Sapienza, and Almeida (2000)
found that firms that expand internationally earlier in
their life grow faster overall and in foreign markets, as
they do not need to overcome a domestic orientation later.
Also, Zahra, Ireland, and Hitt (2000) found that a diverse
international environment created more opportunities for
technical learning for new venture firms.
While such firms may still represent a relatively small
proportion of new ventures (Katz, Safranski, and Khan
2003) (unique to firms competing in modern, high-tech
industries), there is evidence of firms supporting this born
global pattern (Bell et al. 2003). Such industries increasing-
ly demonstrate the importance of networks (Adler and
Kwon 2002; Autio 2000; Spencer 2003), emphasize inter-
firm collaboration, and often are driven by an internation-
ally accepted industry standard (such as a computer oper-
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ating system). Further, these industries often are knowl-
edge-based (Autio, Sapienza, and Almeida 2000; Zahra,
Ireland, and Hitt 2000), where such knowledge is unique
and the source of competitive advantage. Firms in such
industries often are uniquely endowed with highly specif-
ic resources that enable them to provide specialized prod-
ucts. As such, the resource-based view and network per-
spective both can help to explain the growth of interna-
tional entrepreneurial firms (Young, Pavlos, and Leo-Paul
2003). Similarly, this article uses these perspectives to
define when new ventures are likely to exhibit this inter-
national entrepreneurial behavior.
Ultimately, resources external to the firm, such as infra-
structure, which explain entrepreneurship in general (Van
de Ven 1993), seem to be driving international entrepre-
neurship as well. For this research, infrastructure is con-
sidered to be resources that are available beyond the level
of the firm; they are not firm specific. However, many
high-tech new ventures may be exposed to these external
resources, but not all exhibit these “born global” character-
istics. Such ventures must still possess firm-specific capa-
bilities that enable them to identify and take advantage of
these external resources. To be successful, firms must
employ strategies and develop organizational capabilities
to integrate and diffuse knowledge (Zahra, Ireland, and
Hitt 2000) so that these firms are able to exploit, enhance,
or collectively develop this infrastructure. That is, firm
strategies and capabilities act as moderators, strengthen-
ing the basic relationship of external resources explaining
international entrepreneurship; in fact, they are necessary
for this relationship. Therefore, explanations for interna-
tional entrepreneurship may derive from certain cost fac-
tors (Swamidass 1993), possession and utilization of
unique global resources, and global networks (Adler and
Kwon 2002; Spencer, 2003; Young, Pavlos, and Leo-Paul
2003), with firm strategies and capabilities moderating
(strengthening) this relationship.
Capabilities are the firm’s capacity to accumulate, inte-
grate, and deploy resources to achieve a desired end
(Helfat and Raubitschek 2000). First, the competitive inter-
national environment today creates challenges and oppor-
tunities for firms to distinguish themselves competitively
and create value for customers, as customers and competi-
tors are increasingly global in scope. Second, the increas-
ing prevalence of alliances, international networks, global
resources, etc. presents vast learning opportunities for
firms. Firms must have deliberate strategies to acquire
these global resources, disseminate them throughout the
organization, and deploy them to achieve competitive
advantage. Firms that recognize and respond to these
opportunities will succeed internationally.
This study focuses not only on "born global" firms that
exhibit international characteristics at an early stage, but
firms suddenly internationalizing after a long period of
focusing on the domestic market (Bell et al. 2003), as the
conditions presented in this model may apply to either
phenomena. Finally, for purposes of this study, infrastruc-
ture is not a regional issue; it must be available at the glob-
al level. That is, contrary to many of the studies of inter-
firm relations, the primary focus of this article is not on
geographic clusters, but on global networks designed to
exploit, enhance, or develop specific interfirm resources.
Therefore, many of these networks are designed around
specific resources, dedicated to their global development,
rather than around geographic areas.
Theory and Propositions
Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) argued that to be successful,
firms need to blend the past and the present; that is, to use
the old (an established, legitimated framework) and the
new (some novel contribution). Even firms marketing
innovative new technologies may get into trouble by
ignoring the past, such as an accepted standard, demon-
strating too much disconnect. Furthermore, firms must
strike an ideal balance of internal collaboration within the
organization, using a standard technology, sharing a dis-
tribution channel, gaining economies of scale in purchas-
ing, cooperating on a one-time product development proj-
ect, or simply sharing knowledge (Brown and Eisenhardt
1998).
However, small and young ventures must also compete
in this environment, which may be problematic. For exam-
ple, a young firm has a limited past, providing little
opportunity to connect to an established track record.
Whereas the failure of some incumbent firms may stem
from the tendency to rest on successes (connect to the past)
and get in a rut, entrepreneurial ventures often fail
because they were unable to secure acceptance for their
product of the future (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Brown and
Eisenhardt 1998). In this case the new venture may be
advised to utilize an accepted platform as its connection to
the past. The established framework provides an infra-
structure for the new venture from which it can launch its
innovation. Second, small firms may have limited oppor-
tunities for internal collaboration, and hence may require
more external collaboration within a network alliance.
That is, the edge of chaos (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998)
characterizing many dynamic industries today require
entrepreneurial new ventures to actively utilize infrastruc-
ture in order to survive. Entrepreneurship then is actually
the collective achievement of many institutions (Van de
Ven 1993) as firms improve or add novelties to an existing
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framework. Moreover, as these industries now tend to be
global, with the established standards accepted around the
world, networks tend to be increasingly global in scope as
well. Further, as the resources required to compete in these
industries are so specialized and unique, firms must
increasingly seek them out on a global basis.
As such, external resources, which increasingly reflect a
global scope, are posited in this article as explaining inter-
national entrepreneurship, specifically in the case of high-
tech new ventures. The three factors identified include
industry cost factors, unique global resources, and net-
works. However, only new ventures possessing certain
firm-specific capabilities to integrate knowledge (Zahra,
Ireland, and Hitt 2000), or learn, will be able to identify
and take advantage of such global resources, and there-
fore, expand internationally.
Cost Factors
Traditionally, large firms were able to minimize cost
through mass production to achieve scale economies and
international production to achieve location economies
(Dunning 1988; Rugman 1980). However, smaller entre-
preneurial firms may not be able to achieve returns to scale
or exploit location economies through intrafirm sourcing.
They must rely on interfirm collaboration.
That is, many industries face substantial fixed costs,
with very low marginal costs of diffusion and imitation,
bringing plummeting average costs, and hence, increasing
returns to scale. (This is particularly true of the high-tech-
nology industries showing such rapid internationaliza-
tion.)  Many firms may expand internationally in order to
exploit returns to scale. That is, international expansion
may be a necessity for high-technology firms facing sub-
stantial R&D and start-up costs, to be profitable within a
rapidly evolving technological environment (Jolly,
Alahuhta, and Jeannet 1992). This is especially true if the
firm faces a limited niche in the domestic market early in
the life cycle, such as would be the case for disruptive
technology (Bower and Christensen 1995), where the new
technology initially serves a small segment—competing
with a wider market for the old sustaining technology.
That is, a technology entrepreneur is generally niche-
focused, and a single home market may not be broad
enough to support the R&D, finance, marketing, and dis-
tribution that such a firm would face (Hordes, Clancy, and
Baddaley 1995). Furthermore, in this high-tech environ-
ment, the cost drivers increasingly are not firm specific.
Interfirm sourcing and collaboration (Swamidass 1993) are
necessary to achieve cost minimization. The high fixed
costs, particularly for high-technology industries, given
the limited resources of small entrepreneurial ventures,
require interfirm collaboration, while shorter product life
cycles further demand cooperation and product exten-
sions deriving from a single design platform (Garud and
Kumaraswamy 1995).
Of course, many high-tech ventures likely demonstrate
substantial returns to scale, yet relatively few new ven-
tures may still fit the "born global" profile. Therefore, it
would appear that firms which are able to maximize tech-
nical learning, and which are exposed to such increased
learning opportunities from a varied international envi-
ronment, are therefore more likely to expand their sales
internationally (Zahra, Ireland, and Hitt 2000). In knowl-
edge-driven industries, there are vast opportunities to
accumulate knowledge about cost management, and
much of this knowledge is available internationally. Firms
must be able to tap into this knowledge, disseminate it
throughout their organization, and develop the capabili-
ties to apply this knowledge to their own organizational
processes. Such firms are likely to be exposed to ways of
improving efficiency and benefiting from returns to scale,
and are able to incorporate it into their own operations.
The firms that do accumulate this global knowledge will
have an international orientation (Autio, Sapienza, and
Almeida 2000), and will be likely to expand sales interna-
tionally.
Proposition 1: New high-tech ventures exhibiting
tremendous fixed costs will demonstrate greater interna-
tional operations (sales) than firms that face fewer fixed
costs, if such ventures possess organizational capabili-
ties to integrate and apply technical knowledge to
exploit returns to scale.
However, increasing returns to scale may be supplant-
ed by a more powerful, and more unique, economic phe-
nomenon: increasing marginal returns. Increasing returns,
common to the high-tech and knowledge-based indus-
tries, are the tendency for that which is ahead to get fur-
ther ahead. This stems from high up-front costs with low
costs of diffusion, network effects, and technology lock-in
(Arthur 1996). An example of this phenomenon would be
Netscape, where each additional new user (Beinhocker
1997), and likewise each additional new entrepreneur uti-
lizing the infrastructure, increases the total value of the
system. Some firms facing increasing marginal returns
would likely pursue international expansion to enhance
the effect, wishing to further expand their customer base
and "lock in" their technology in those areas that are
expected to present great potential future income growth.
In the same sense, network externalities (the increase in
user utility as others adopt the product or compatible
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products) (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995) reflect impor-
tant phenomena in many high-technology industries
today. That is, many technologies today are systemic in
nature (Winter 1987), meaning they are embodied in inter-
connecting multicomponent products (Garud and
Kumaraswamy 1995). This requires substantial investment
in several complementary technologies and assets (Powell
and Brantley 1992; Teece 1987), making it difficult for any
one firm to invest in all complementary technologies
(Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995).
Garud and Kumaraswamy (1995) and Brown and
Eisenhardt (1998) further argue that such factors encour-
age firms to conform to a common standard or dominant
design, to manufacture products that are compatible with
the standard technology. For example, a network of firms
may establish an open standard, which acts as mecha-
nisms for coordinating the emerging network. As the den-
sity of firms manufacturing technological systems that
conform to this common standard increases, customers get
a wider choice of complementary products, so more cus-
tomers get onboard. The larger customer base then
encourages more firms to adhere to these industry-wide
standards, increasing network benefits further. The larger
the network, the greater its attraction. Externalities may
derive from production as well as consumption (Dunning
1995). This concept refers to a technological network,
based upon a common standard. Strategies to form orga-
nizational networks, to encourage interfirm collaboration,
are addressed below.
In some cases, even large dominant firms, which initial-
ly have been reluctant to adopt open standards fearing
loss of market share, eventually have become compelled to
adhere to an industry-wide standard (Garud and
Kumaraswamy 1995). There is no reason to suppose that
this network should be limited to a single country. Foreign
firms will wish to adopt this established standard as read-
ily as the domestic firms, as will foreign customers. At this
point, any firm within the network will face global com-
petitors, partners, as well as customers. Globalization
becomes inherent in the infrastructure.
These factors, network externalities as well as industry
standardization, have an important effect on what consti-
tutes competitive advantage, and how it is derived. The
traditional batch-processing industries have generally
demonstrated the importance of firm-level economies of
scale and scope, encouraging larger firm size and greater
complexity. Large oligopolistic competitors (like MNCs)
would compete for greater market share, and would
extend their operations internationally, developing their
firm-level economies of scale and scope, and learning
economies. Organization theory, especially international-
ization theory, has been grounded in the same assump-
tions.
However, the continual innovation seen in many high-
tech industries limits the potential for scale economies
(Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995). Some firm-specific
advantages in high-tech industries are slowly being sup-
planted by the importance of network externalities and
complementarity of assets, advantages that go beyond any
single firm. These high-tech industries are more likely to
require a dominant design and industry standards. This
mitigates the advantages of large and established firms,
which benefits entrepreneurial ventures, which are then
better able to compete with the large MNCs in the global
arena.
Of course, recognizing opportunities from network
externalities, and developing strategies to exploit these
opportunities, is quite a challenge. Firms that are exposed
to a variety of technical information from these networks,
particularly internationally, and possess organizational
capabilities of absorbing this knowledge and applying it to
their own processes, will reflect an international orienta-
tion, given that these technological networks in high-tech
industries are increasingly global in scope. Therefore, such
firms are likely to expand sales internationally. 
Proposition 2:  New high-tech ventures attempting to
exploit increasing marginal returns from network exter-
nalities will demonstrate greater international opera-
tions than firms that do not pursue such network exter-
nalities, if they possess organizational capabilities to
integrate and apply technical knowledge to exploit mar-
ginal returns.
Possession/Utilization of Global Resources
Unique resources so critical to many high tech industries
today are increasingly available on a global scale. Firms
may need to draw from the pool of capital, labor, and
knowledge (Van de Ven 1993) on a global scale.
Furthermore, importing, exporting, sourcing (Kotabe
1992), has been facilitated, leading to a global distribution
of many products and services. For example, new financ-
ing options, such as countertrade, have facilitated export-
ing (Carter, Narasimhan, and Vickery 1988; Swamidass
1993). That is, the international trade of goods, services,
knowledge, financing, and labor is now commonplace.
While many of these resources comprise external
resources, firms must possess the capability to effectively
utilize and take advantage of these resources.
Perlmutter (1969), looking specifically at multinational
corporations, recognized environmental forces leading to
a more geocentric orientation, such as technological and
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managerial knowledge increasing in availability around
the world, and the integration of international transport
and telecommunications systems. These aspects of the
growing "international infrastructure" may actually bene-
fit smaller entrepreneurial ventures, as they depend on
this infrastructure to survive, more than large corpora-
tions. According to Van de Ven (1993), entrepreneurs ben-
efit from infrastructure resource endowments such as sci-
entific/technological research, financing mechanisms, and
human resources. Each of these resources is increasingly
found on an international scale, and require that firms
wishing to exploit them be international in scope as well.
For example, some firms in high-tech, capital, and
knowledge-intensive industries increasingly must acquire
resources on a global level. Many resources are so special-
ized that a sufficient endowment simply cannot be found
in any single local area. Some Silicon Valley firms, for
example, often may need to draw from a pool of human
resources on a global scale. A web-based IPO may target
various parts of the world to obtain the substantial finan-
cial sums that are required. Some biotechnology firms all
over the world utilize scientific and technological research
pertaining to the Human Genome project for drug devel-
opment. These infrastructure resource endowments
increasingly ignore national borders, and firms exploiting
these resources are likely to have a global perspective, and
are therefore more likely to sell their products internation-
ally. Of course, only ventures with unique resource
endowments and a well-organized process of integrating
these diverse global resources will effectively find ways to
obtain and utilize this global resource. Firms that effective-
ly incorporate and integrate these global resources into
their business operations will possess an international ori-
entation, and therefore will be likely to expand sales inter-
nationally.
Proposition 3:  New high-tech ventures that draw upon
knowledge, financing, or labor on an international scale
will demonstrate greater international operations than
firms that focus predominantly on domestic sources, if
they possess organizational capabilities to identify and
integrate these global resources into their operations.
Clearly technological advances in transportation and
communication have enabled large corporations to
expand their international operations (Perlmutter 1969).
This has made intrafirm international trade quite com-
mon. However, the advent of new information technolo-
gies (Zuboff 1984) also improves interfirm coordination
(Fombrun and Astley 1982), thereby reducing transaction
costs (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995).
For example, the Internet, and the way business can be
done through this medium, has a global scope and this is
part of its appeal. Furthermore, its value is recognized on
a global level—by populations the world over, so a firm
intending to market its product internationally that uti-
lizes this medium already has an advantage. That is, the
Internet has obtained legitimacy at the industry- or tech-
nology-level which is recognized globally, meaning firms
that depend on this medium are less likely to face the lia-
bility of newness (Stinchcombe 1965) that often plagues
new organizational forms. That is, industrywide (or net-
workwide) legitimacy helps to reduce the importance of
firm-level legitimacy. This format provides a kind of infra-
structure for the start-up companies.
Furthermore, part of the appeal of the product of a firm
may be its global scope. In fact, a product, technology, or
service in general may be recognized globally, regardless
of the specific firm that utilizes it. As argued above, glob-
alization may become inherent in the platform provided
by a network, as foreign firms and customers get onboard.
In the same sense that a larger network brings greater
attractiveness, a more global platform brings greater
appeal to customers around the world. That is, more firms
using the platform means more customers, and vice-versa.
More global firms using the platform means more global
customers, and vice-versa.
Of course, global resources are readily available to
many new ventures, yet only some have utilized the
resources to expand internationally, just as only a few
Internet companies have been able to achieve competitive
advantage online. Clearly, the firms must possess clear
strategies to exploit the resource, and must demonstrate
capabilities in integrating this global resource into their
operations to achieve competitive advantage. Such firms,
oriented toward this important and valued global
resource, are likely then to expand sales internationally.
Proposition 4:  New high-tech ventures that effectively
exploit a global platform (such as a distribution channel)
are likely to demonstrate greater international opera-
tions than firms that do not utilize such a platform, if
they possess organizational capabilities to integrate and
exploit this platform.
Network Strategies
Finally, organizational networks (Adler and Kwon 2002)
comprise a critical component of explaining international
entrepreneurship today (Wright and Leo-Paul, 2003;
Young, Pavlos, and Leo-Paul 2003). A strategy of forming
alliances, joint ventures, or cooperative arrangements,
may be important for small entrepreneurial ventures to
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develop and utilize interfirm resources. These arrange-
ments may be with suppliers, customers, and competitors,
as well as with large established MNCs and/or other high-
tech entrepreneurs. In fact, networks may be particularly
important for knowledge-based industries, which are so
applicable in explaining international entrepreneurship
(Bell et al. 2003). For example, knowledge-diffusion net-
works have been found to be critical for firm competitive-
ness as well as helping to establish industry standards
(Spencer 2003).
A new firm usually must form linkages with other firms
to establish legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol 1994) or obtain
access to distribution channels. Interfirm associations help
to bring skills and financial resources as well as legitimacy
and market power (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996).
Therefore, the formation of partnerships and strategic
alliances is critical for firms to achieve competitive advan-
tage nowadays. Sometimes, a firm may lack certain
resources or skills that they may be able to obtain by form-
ing linkages with other firms. That is, firms may have
complementary resources, skills and experiences that
would encourage cooperation. For example, Barnett (1990)
found that technological standardization (compatibility)
and differentiation (complementarity) tended to lead to
positive interdependence (mutualism) and hence coopera-
tion among phone companies.
In the same sense, Baum and Singh (1994) found that
entrepreneurial firms, depending on the degree of overlap
of the niches in which they were founded, might have
complementary resources that they can exchange or com-
plement. Furthermore, the complementary skills and
resources of established incumbents and entrepreneurial
ventures, as well as the necessity of producing an industry
dominant design and setting industry standards, may
necessitate formation of linkages between established
incumbents and entrepreneurial ventures. Entrepreneurs
may help to institutionalize their environments through
alliances with an established, dominant company in the
industry.
These same issues are relevant for a firm wishing to
expand internationally. Alliances may be an attractive
means of entering foreign markets (Gugler 1992). Small
firms can often gain the necessary resources for interna-
tional activity through cooperative relationships with
other firms (Bonaccorsi 1992; McDougall, Shane, and
Oviatt 1994). That is, a firm with a skill in a particular tech-
nological product or process, but with limited internation-
al experience, may form a partnership with a firm or firms
that have considerable international experience.
International operations carry with it considerable risks,
which can be shared by the group or network, thereby
reducing the risk for a single firm. The network of firms
can bring their collective skills and experiences to the
global competitive environment, thereby mitigating the
firm-specific advantages that large, established MNCs
may have. In this sense, Chang (1995) argued that firms in
business groups were more likely to go overseas than
independent firms.
These factors make it even more essential for entrepre-
neurs competing in the global marketplace to form link-
ages and alliances. A small entrepreneurial venture has
limited global resources and less international experience
than a large MNC. Hence the sharing of resources as well
as risks would help the entrepreneur to compete with the
larger incumbents. Furthermore, as the entrepreneurs and
MNCs likely possess complementary skills themselves
(the former bringing radical new product or process inno-
vation, the latter having considerable experience, access to
resources, and legitimacy, on a global scale), they may
actually form cooperative partnerships with each other.
Such partnerships between the incumbents and entrepre-
neurs may bring the innovation for the MNC, while secur-
ing resources and legitimacy that the new venture
requires. Further, when one MNC forms a partnership
with a high-tech firm, other MNCs may be forced to form
such partnerships as a competitive response.
As a result, if entrepreneurial ventures form linkages
with established MNCs early in their life, such as partner-
ships and strategic alliances, they will likely expand inter-
nationally more quickly as a result. Interestingly, Preece,
Miles, and Baetz (1999), using a bivariate variable, found
no relationship between strategic alliance formation and
international activity. Perhaps simply participating in joint
ventures and alliances alone is not associated with interna-
tionalization, as many new ventures form alliances yet rel-
atively few actually expand internationally immediately.
Even engaging in international interfirm cooperation with
the intent of selling internationally may not necessarily
result in international success for some firms, but rather
possessing the organizational capabilities to identify the
right international partners (possessing complementary
objectives as well as resources), maximize learning
throughout the network, and to effectively leverage net-
work resources to achieve competitive advantage globally,
will then likely be associated with international activity.
Proposition 5: New high-tech ventures that form link-
ages with established companies will demonstrate
greater international operations than firms that oper-
ate alone, if they possess organizational capabilities
to absorb and disseminate knowledge across the net-
work.
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In recent years, the combination of two increasingly
common trends may also contribute to the born global
phenomenon: the increasing use of outsourcing by large
corporations and the rapid evolution of new technologies.
MNCs increasingly globally outsource many functions to
outside firms (Kotabe 1998). Coupled with rapid techno-
logical innovation, much of it being developed and mar-
keted by entrepreneurs, this tendency is helping interna-
tional entrepreneurs to play a greater role in developing
and producing new innovative products and processes for
the major MNCs. Those firms serving these MNCs must
expand to where their clients operate. Miller and Parkhe
(1998) recognized the "follow the client" argument for
firms expanding internationally. In fact, many small ven-
tures are actually spin-offs of large firms, owe their success
primarily to being clients or suppliers to major MNCs, or
are part of a keiretsu-like network dominated by a large
MNC (Dunning 1995).
The established MNCs have long been internationally
focused, giving the entrepreneurial ventures a leg up on
international expansion. That is, the global orientation of
the MNCs coupled with their increasing inclination to out-
source to smaller firms producing new technologies, help
to encourage these entrepreneurial firms to operate
increasingly on an international scale.
Furthermore, for some industries, the market is viewed
on a global basis, not as distinct national boundaries.
Many young entrepreneurs have a single global market
perspective. Perlmutter (1969) recognized growing world
markets and international customers as forces that may
encourage greater geocentrism for MNCs. This seems to
be the case more and more for entrepreneurial ventures as
well, particularly those who possess a clear strategic objec-
tive of learning from their clients’ international experience
and expertise, and develop the organizational capabilities
to successfully integrate this knowledge into their own
operations. That is, the international orientation of their
clients will likely translate into an international orientation
for the new venture, likely resulting in increased interna-
tional sales for that venture.
Proposition 6: New high-tech ventures that serve MNC
clients will demonstrate greater international operations
than firms serving more single-country customers, if
they possess organizational capabilities to integrate and
apply their clients’ international knowledge.
Performance Implications
Because of the advantages that infrastructure may provide
for entrepreneurial ventures, firm performance (survival
and profitability) may depend upon the extent to which
these ventures utilize this infrastructure. This article
argues that firms that operate as part of a network or plat-
form, whose standards may well likely be accepted glob-
ally, will demonstrate greater international operations, if
they possess the firm capabilities to learn. It is also argued
that firms which demonstrate this global reach will be able
to further exploit increasing returns to scale, increasing
marginal returns, and global legitimacy. As a result, these
firms should demonstrate superior performance.
Therefore,
Proposition 7: Younger and newer ventures that expand
internationally will demonstrate superior performance
than their domestic-only counterparts.
Model
The purpose of this research has been to develop theory
regarding international entrepreneurship. However,
empirical studies are needed, so the following section will
develop the model, suggest possible operationalizations
for the constructs in this article, and provide some sugges-
tions about how this model could be tested.
The independent variable would measure the degree to
which the firm utilizes infrastructure (interfirm resources),
including cost factors, global resources, and network
strategies. Specifically, this variable would include degree
of fixed costs, degree of network externalities, utilization
of global resources and an external infrastructure (such as
the Internet), alliances with MNCs, and major MNCs as
clients. Much of this data could be collected via question-
naire, or if available, secondary data reflecting Internet
sales, number of alliances, and client information.
Measuring the dependent variable Internationaliz-
ation would be critical for this study. The "percent of rev-
enue generated overseas" cut-off could distinguish the
international firms from domestic only, and would meas-
ure intensity. Alternatively, firms that seem to be the
most globally oriented (having operations in many dis-
tinct countries) as opposed to those that may do business
in fewer and a less diverse set of foreign markets. As
such, consistent with Preece, Miles, and Baetz (1999) as
well as Hout, Porter and Rudden (1982), an empirical
study should make a distinction between firms operating
internationally from those operating globally. Global
diversity (or scope) refers to targeting various distinct
market areas, such as Asia, Canada, Europe, Latin
America, and the United States. It is important to consid-
er both dimensions, because while it appears that high-
technology ventures are expanding internationally early,
it is also the case that managing disparate global opera-
tions is an immense undertaking for firms (Bartlett and
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Ghoshal 1991; Hitt, Tyler, and Park 1995; Prahalad and
Doz 1987), but especially for new ventures. A good
empirical contribution for such a study could also con-
sider firms that enter into countries that are at various
stages of economic development as being more globally
diverse. That is, an American firm that enters the
Japanese market faces cultural and linguistic diversity.
An American firm that enters India faces cultural, lin-
guistic, and degree of market development diversity. The
third dimension of Internationalization could then be the
annual growth rate of international sales, or speed of
internationalization.
Finally, performance is measured in this model.
Altogether, the model measures whether interfirm
resources lead to increased international operations, then
whether that translates into superior performance. The
determining factor is whether the firm has a clear strategy
and possesses the capabilities to identify and integrate these
external resources. The final model is shown in Figure 1.
Conclusions
To test the above model, an industry would have to be
chosen that demonstrates the given constructs. The indus-
try would have to include many firms that rely on tradi-
tional as well as emerging infrastructures, such as the
Internet. There must be variability along the dimension of
the degree to which firms utilize the Internet (or whatever
platform) to deliver their product or services as opposed
to traditional channels. The industry must also include a
large number of entrepreneurial startups that have recent-
ly formed, as well as firms that were formed over the last
10 to 20 years or so, to generate variability in firm size and
age. The industry should also include substantial interna-
tional activity as well as variability among the sampled
firms along this international dimension. Possible targets
where the theories posed in this article may be most appli-
cable include the software industry, publishing industry,
music industry (such as radio or sales of CDs), or financial
services industries.
The current study has proposed a model of internation-
al entrepreneurship and established propositions. The
study has drawn from and integrated various literature
streams, including infrastructure for entrepreneurship
(Van de Ven 1993), global sourcing (Swamidass 1993), and
alliance capitalism (Dunning 1995). How these concepts
reinforce each other and, as applied to interfirm
resources, are important in describing international entre-
preneurship, was addressed in this article. Some method-
ological issues were presented for an empirical research,
such as making suggestions about how internationaliza-
tion should be measured. Hopefully this article has pro-
vided some suggestions on how to pursue the theoretical
questions posed here as well as sparked some interest in
doing so.
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The U.N. once dealt only with governments. By now weknow that peace and prosperity cannot be achievedwithout partnership involving governments, interna-
tional organizations, the business community and civil society.
In today’s world we depend on each other.” Kofi Annan, UN
Secretary (1999).
As emphasized by Secretary Annan’s quote, the global
community is increasingly concerned with economic
development and promotion of democracies is focusing
on developing programs to stimulate partnerships among
three distinct sectors: government sector, civil society and
private sector, including locally based and international
entrepreneurs. The modern organization is becoming
increasingly informed in its strategies and practices by the
concepts of learning and knowledge. Modern organiza-
tion theory utilizes an organization as an idiosyncratic set
of knowledge capabilities that are continuously enhanced
and modified by unique learning routines. Thus, the
prospect for success of host country community-based
projects and third-sector communities already involving
the local governments and civil society organizations,
including NGOs and development agencies, could be
enhanced by tapping into the knowledge management
resources of private firms and entrepreneurs.
Following Grosse and Behrman’s (1992) suggestion that
a better understanding of the many and diverse interac-
tions between the various governments, local private
firms, and international entities be more heavily incorpo-
rated into both management and international business
research, this article investigates (1) how enterprises create
and sustain international development, and (2) the com-
bined role that governments, civil society, and private
firms play in this process. Thus, the primary purpose of
this research is to establish the linkage among these three
critical entities in business and economic development of
emerging economies and the associated benefits that may
accrue. Incorporating both knowledge management and
economic reciprocity, we explore various case examples
from Latin America and illustrate the growth of small
business ventures there. Paralleling the research on incu-
bators and intrapreneurship, we suggest that the stronger
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Reciprocity, Knowledge Management, and
Third-Sector Communities
Kogut (1989) identified reciprocity as fundamental to the
achievement of long-term cooperation among business
partners because of its potential to reward and penalize
behavior among the transacting partners. Parkhe (1993)
included reciprocity along with forbearance, trust, and
opportunism as core requirements of international
alliances. In many international alliances, the local govern-
ment may be the reciprocating partner (Kashlak,
Chandran, and DiBenedetto 1998). As illustrated in Figure
1, an increase in reciprocity among the partners will lead
to an increase of knowledge and technology transfer.
Subsequently, the knowledge flow will lead to an increase
in local and regional development in the host country,
which stimulates further entrepreneurial interests in col-
laborative initiatives.
Regarding the government as a partner, national capa-
bilities and government policies play a strong role in
establishing a competitive advantage for
firms from developing countries. For
instance, the importance of networks and
interactions among firms, universities,
research centers, and government organiza-
tions in creating international competitive-
ness has been continually emphasized
(Bartholomew 1997; Freeman 1987, 1994).
Within this thinking, government policies
that are aimed at the provision of an envi-
ronment conducive to business (including
small-business) growth play a critical part in
enhancing the competitive advantage of
firms in a particular country (Aoki, Kim,
and Okuno-Fujiwara 1997). How conducive
the external environment is to growth
depends on how well the national systems
of innovation for the promotion of knowl-
edge and technology are developed and the
extent to which this system allows the vari-
ous players in the economy to interact and
benefit from interfirm cooperation (Porter 1998). 
At the foundation of this country-level approach to
competitiveness are the various project- and sector-based
approaches within the developing countries. It is at these
levels where third-sector communities may benefit
through knowledge management and the subsequent
transfer of specific technologies and skills when develop-
ing microenterprise projects. Specifically, both the knowl-
edge management and organizational learning paradigms
may be utilized to leverage the success of host country
community-based projects at two distinct levels: micro-
level and the macro-level.
At the micro-level, project-based knowledge manage-
ment suggests that partners succeed collectively, as well as
individually, by learning from one another’s historical
competencies. Subsequently, the partners will learn from
the new collective competency that has been and contin-
ues to be created in the collaboration. Figure 2 represents
the project-based knowledge management framework.
In addition to the learning dynamics of the individual
project knowledge transfers among participants, a sepa-
rate learning may occur when sets of projects are
reviewed, analyzed, and appropriately clustered, for
example, at the sectoral level. Thus at this macro-level, sec-
tor-based knowledge management is evident. At the sector
level of knowledge management, the partners’ respective-
ly position themselves to succeed in community-based
projects by learning from a single project or a cluster of
projects in which they may or may not have participated.
Figure 3 illustrates this phenomenon.
Global Development, Poverty Reduction, and
International Entrepreneurs
The World Bank has advocated a new paradigm for pover-
ty reduction, one visualized as a partnership among the
state, business, and civil society, that is, non-profit and
non-governmental organizations. Its arguments for busi-
ness participation have elements of both self-interest and
social capital. A self-interested example would be that of a
private firm having the pick of the labor crop due to its
favorable reputation created by its participation in a local
microenterprise initiative. Social capital, for example, in
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the increase in generic organizational skills created in
those individuals involved in the community project, may
also be enhanced.
Present-day corporate social responsibility owes much
to Private Management and Public Policy: The Principle of
Public Responsibility (Preston and Post 1975). Although
Adam Smith had embedded the concept of self-interest
within a framework of social reciprocity (Tribe 1999), it
took the revolution of the 1960s—civil rights, environmen-
talism, consumer advocacy—to actualize a generally
accepted corporate response to its social environment
(Preston 1990). Preston and Post (1975) pointed out the
route to legitimacy for business’ responsible involvement
in society’s affairs (Lad 1996). They utilized the concept of
“interpenetrating systems” to highlight the reciprocal
“acting and being acted upon” nature between the busi-
ness subsystem (e.g., firm, trade association) and the other
societal subsystems (e.g., regulatory body, consumer
watchdog group, world trade organization). 
Management’s involvement in “multiple simultaneous
interactions” with other elements of the global society
leads to the use of the stakeholder analysis. The stakehold-
er approach (Freeman 1984, 1994; Freeman and Evan 1990)
enlarged management’s vision beyond shareholders to
include the interests and claims of others in society who
had an interest in the activities of the firm. The multina-
tional firm creates more stakeholders from its internation-
al activities than would be found in a purely domestic
operation (Johnson 1995). Waddock (1996) advocated that
the treatment of stakeholders, including the communities
and the environment, is to be considered part of the fun-
damental purpose of the firm. Such advocacy naturally
raises the questions of stakeholder identity and salience
(Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). 
These difficult questions are legitimately sidestepped
by Kanter’s (1999) observations that some firms have
moved beyond the concepts involved with the corporate
social responsibility paradigm to those of a corporate
social innovation model. Firms, such as IBM and Verizon,
are seen as utilizing the societal-sector problem as research
laboratories for evolving and strengthening their own core
competencies. While this approach requires more dedica-
tion of both the firm and the stakeholder, there exists
greater payoffs for all parties than have been traditionally
found in the “feel good” projects. Although Kanter (1999)
has a domestic focus, the private firm could also have a
global perspective.
The corporate social responsibility focus intellectually
fits with the strategic management approach that empha-
sizes value creation versus value appropriation in a firm’s
strategic implementation. This is true both internally and
externally (Ghoshal, Bartlett, and Morgan 1999). This
resource-based concept with its emphasis on knowledge
growth, both individually and organizationally, ties nicely
to Kanter’s laboratory approach to societal-sector prob-
lems. Intertwined, this joint theoretical justification to cor-
porate involvement in global poverty-reduction projects
appears to be compelling. If so, the resultant benefit would
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be an enhanced managerial capability plus an economical-
ly enriched local community.
Triad Collaboration and Reciprocity 
in Latin America
We suggest that (1) microenterprise initiatives and the
resulting economic development in a developing country
arising from the collaboration and reciprocity among local
governments, civil society, and private firms will benefit
the community, extended communities, and the firm; (2) a
concern of and proactive involvement in reducing global
poverty will benefit the community, extended communi-
ties, and the private firm; and, (3) both the triad of collab-
oration and the global social responsibility buy-in will
help to reinforce democracy initiatives in a community,
region, or country. The following section illustrates four
case examples from Latin America developed by the Inter-
American Foundation (IFA) (Jones 2002). All of the exam-
ples fit into the three-party collaborative efforts empha-
sized in this article. All exhibit government support at the
local and national levels. All also illustrate a degree of
partner reciprocity that Parkhe (1993) suggested as essen-
tial to the success of strategic alliances. Subsequently, there
is an increase in the proactive involvement of the partners
regarding global poverty reduction and the stimulation of
economic development and democracy through microen-
terprise collaboration. Furthermore, as suggested in the
model presented in Figure 1, each initiative below has led
to further entrepreneurial initiatives in the respective
countries.
Case 1: Minetti (Argentina)
Juan Minetti, SA was founded in 1930 in the city of
Córdoba. Today, Grupo Minetti has Argentina’s second-
largest production capacity of cement and concrete. The
Minetti Foundation was created in 1987 to support
microenterprise programs that facilitate the self-help
development of individuals and their organizations, and
to improve the standard of living of low-income popula-
tions. Since then, it has donated cement for community
construction projects, provided training and other
resources to unemployed workers and community organ-
izations, and promoted corporate social responsibility
(CSR) among other Argentine corporations. 
The Minetti Foundation is considered a leader in CSR.
It is a member of Argentina’s prestigious Group of
Foundations that includes Bunge and Born Foundation,
YPF Foundation, Telefónica Foundation, Bank Boston
Foundation, Kellogg Foundation, and ARCOR
Foundation. As a result of its partnership with IAF, the
Minetti Foundation now plays an even larger role than
funding grants in the community. It is an example for
Argentine corporations looking to improve their CSR pro-
grams. Between 1997 and 2001, the Minetti Foundation
and the IAF contributed $285,000 each to create the
“Building Bridges Fund," which provided grants to 28
microenterprises in the province of Córdoba. While the
focus of this fund was primarily informal education, the
guiding principle was that of building relationship capital
for Grupo Minetti and for the grant recipients. More
impressive, however, is that there were nearly 250 partici-
pating organizations that mobilized a total of $884,000 in
cash and in-kind resources which was 150 percent more
than the actual financing awarded through the Building
Bridges grants. As a result of the track record established
by Building Bridges, in 2001 the Minetti Foundation lever-
aged $120,000 from Spain-based Telefónica Foundation to
complement its $170,000 for a technical assistance fund for
community organizations. 
In 2002, U.S.-based Hispanics in Philanthropy matched
that $290,000 dollar for dollar. As part of its continuing
leadership, the Minetti Foundation also held a workshop
for several businesses in the province of Buenos Aires. The
majority agreed on the benefits of adopting the Minetti
Foundation’s philosophy and methodology (i.e., shifting
from simple donations to financing projects that strength-
en local organizations). Already, five companies have
joined forces to support a local educational project and
plan to provide monitoring and other follow-up. While the
Minetti Foundation was created to “do good” in the com-
munity, these are examples of the returns it has produced,
especially from creating its first grant-making fund,
Building Bridges.
Like Grupo Minetti, the Minetti Foundation takes calcu-
lated risks that yield high returns on a small investment.
For example, “Building Bridges” provided a grant of
15,000 pesos to La Merced Housing and Service
Cooperative in a semi-rural community both impover-
ished and isolated—physically, economically, socially, and
culturally. Both adults and children suffered high rates of
illiteracy because the written word was virtually absent:
no street signs, no sign indicating the name of the school,
and worse, no books. With support from Building Bridges,
a group of concerned parents, educators, and social work-
ers initiated a program of educational support for at-risk
students that evolved into an ongoing, youth-led project
involving 80 children. Youth involved in “The Kids Place”
tutor their younger peers and develop other extracurricu-
lar activities that help both groups stay in school—and
succeed there. A follow-up grant was made to the organi-
zation that emerged from the project, Protagonism for
Community Activities (PROCOM).
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After three years, the progress has been significant. For
instance, two 12-year-old librarians hunch over a note-
book, writing slowly and carefully as they sign books in
and out of a community children’s library. The "Kid’s"
community center is covered with colorful posters listing
the group's objectives and achievements, and each cubby
and pencil holder is carefully labeled with a handwritten
sign. Furthermore, visitors are given a copy of Little
Workers, the youth’s literary magazine filled with their
own stories and poems. According to project coordinator
Adriana Alanis, “More than just the money, it was the
encouragement that we received in our visits from the
Minetti Foundation, the training, and the opportunity to
learn from other groups, such as how to start our library,
step-by-step. The money is important, but the other is just
as critical.” One of the most dramatic project results is that
the community has come together to make it sustainable.
Ms. Alanis reports, “There are many urgent needs in this
community, even hunger, so we’ve begun producing food.
If we secure outside help, we will be able to respond more
quickly. If not, we will still succeed, just more slowly. But
the commitment and protagonism are there. That’s what’s
new.”  La Merced is often showcased as a model for com-
munity development—and has received unsolicited dona-
tions for its work. According to Ms. Alanis, “One woman
who read the book called to say she wanted to help but
wanted anonymity. So twice a week we go by and the
manager of her apartment building hands us what we
need to provide nutritional snacks to the children at The
Kid’s Place. Others provide scholarships for the students.
Support from Building Bridges has also given other
grantee organizations the experience and track record that
has allowed them to mobilize public and private
resources, local and nationally.
Case 2: La Fundación Proyecto Paria (Venezuela)
La Fundación Proyecto Paria (FPP) is a microenterprise
experiment in Venezuela. FPP operates in Sucre, one of
Venezuela's poorest states and has a special focus on the
“Vuelta Larga–Puipuy” axis. All of FPP’s programs in the
area are part of a proposal to bring together business and
social sectors in strategic alliances. The foundation was
started by a group of businesspeople who wanted to spur
local economic growth through microenterprises. Today,
FPP’s mission is "to promote the enhancement of quality
of life for the population of the Paria region of Sucre, by
formulating and supporting projects and actions which, in
harmony with the natural setting and with the active par-
ticipation of local actors, contribute to the region's devel-
opment and the sustained realization of the population's
economic, social, and cultural rights." 
In 1988, a group of local development pioneers con-
ceived of a project that would transform the Paria region
by promoting local tourism. The initiative grew to include
development of local agriculture as well. It was later
refined to reflect the necessary balance between the quest
for local economic success and equitable improvements in
the living conditions and quality of life for the people in
these communities. Ultimately, through a process of con-
tinual searching and creative discussion, FPP formulated
its growing conviction that, to help promote sustainable
development in the region's rural sector, FPP must pro-
mote the development of businesses that are identified as
having the most potential to increase the incomes of local
communities in need.  
FPP discovered that cacao, one of the region's ancient
crops, could be a multiplier for human and economic
growth in the area. Currently, Venezuela controls 17 per-
cent of the market for fine or aromatic cacao. FPP’s cacao
project falls into this niche. This market access coupled
with cacao’s association with tradition, respect and hard
work, make the crop a natural focus for one of FPP’s eco-
nomic development projects. With this in mind, FPP began
to revive and plant land suitable for organic cacao. Under
the cacao program, FPP has made significant gains: five
associations of small producers were established; 424 pro-
ducers were trained; 88 loans were granted to small pro-
ducers; and the community has been reacquaintance with
an activity all its own, cacao growing. Productivity during
the first three years of the program exceeded the goal of
600Kg/hectare, reaching 825Kg/hectare. The goal of
restoring 75 hectares of crops was exceeded up to 82
hectares; and approximately 120 additional hectares are
being restored. In 2001, FPP opened a cacao manufactur-
ing plant. 
Within its cacao project, FPP has continued to tie its pro-
ductive strategy with a broader local development vision
to include considering its impact on education, health, and
the local economy. Under an eight-year, cofinancing agree-
ment, the IAF and Petroléos de Venezuela (PDVSA),
financed FPP’s comprehensive program, taking into
account cacao's potential vis-à-vis basic needs in the area.
Respecting local cultural and contextual boundaries, the
FPP, IAF, and PDVSA realized that the productive, com-
munity, and technological resources needed to ensure the
project’s success would not be easy to apply or easy for the
community to accept.  So, FPP developed a methodology
to disseminate and implement teaching tools that guaran-
teed, in simple language, the local communities' abilities
to profit from their hard work harvesting organic cacao.
In 1992, the IAF and PDVSA formalized an agreement
to cofinance projects that reflected sustainable, innovative
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development solutions to the complex situations facing
some of Venezuela's most disadvantaged populations. The
IAF's value-added included its knowledge of working
with and commitment to participatory community devel-
opment. As a result of the agreement, PDVSA established
a centralized social investment program which awards
grants to community groups with self-help development
projects. Currently, IAF and PDVSA remain active in the
same community development arena and cooperate as the
country's largest donors. 
FPP’s project was cofinanced by IAF-PDVSA in 1999.
The project is an opportunity for the company to foster a
stable society, which ultimately helps it move forward
with its business activities. Regarding sustainability, FPP
has a long history of cooperating with the public and pri-
vate sectors to promote development in the state of Sucre.
For FPP, diversification of its funding sources has been
fundamental to ensure the organization’s well-being.
From the outset, FPP had private-sector funding sources,
specifically CORPOMEDINA, the region's major financier
of business development projects involving tourism and
real estate development. PDVSA continues to support FPP
and most recently awarded the foundation a grant toward
FPP’s program “Promotion of the comprehensive develop-
ment of the cacao producing communities of Paria.”  
Similarly, Compañía Anónima Nacional Teléfonos de
Venezuela (CANTV) has also contributed to that local
development process. With regard to multilateral cooper-
ation agencies, FPP has received contributions from the
United Nations Population Activities Fund (UNPAF), the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Andean
Development Corporation (CAF). This project has given
the local community an opportunity to learn, demonstrate,
expand, and turn its abilities into a tool for sustainable
development. This project result ensures that community
and the companies doing business in the area are satisfied
that more public–private sector alliances in the region are
strengthened, and that the communities' own values are
reinforced.
Case 3: Viva Rio (Brazil)
Viva Rio’s mission is to promote a culture of peace and jus-
tice in Rio de Janeiro. To that end, the organization works
in the areas of human rights, education, sports, environ-
ment, and community development. Viva Rio works with
close to 400 low-income communities in 34 municipalities
in the state of Rio de Janeiro. It also has an innovative
series of microenterprise programs related to Internet,
technology, microcredit, and fair trade that are proving
extremely successful in linking low-income communities
to new markets.
Through its partnership with Globo Organizations (O
Globo), Viva Rio has worked to bring Internet access to
low-income communities through the installation of
“Future Stations” in favelas throughout the city. O Globo
is a media conglomerate that includes broadcast, cable,
and satellite TV networks, newspapers, a publishing com-
pany, a radio network, and an Internet portal. In 2002, the
network boasted revenues in excess of US$2.5 billion. The
company ranks among the top ten media companies in the
world. The partnership between Viva Rio and O Globo
demonstrates that successful partnerships have both insti-
tutional and individual commitments. The relationship
between Viva Rio and Globo is solid and consistent. The
company, corporate foundation (Fundação Roberto
Marinho), and the founder and president, Roberto
Marinho are committed to the programs undertaken with
Viva Rio. Specifically, O Globo has supported the develop-
ment and maintenance of the website through its Internet
company, Globo.com. In addition, O Globo contributed
more than $1 million to the creation and maintenance of
the vivafavela.com website, and is contributing resources
to the development of the virtual store. 
Both Roberto Marinho and Margarida Ramos, director
of Social Responsibility for Globo Organizations, are on
Viva Rio’s board of directors. Likewise, the director of
Viva Rio, Rubem Fernandes, is on the board of the Roberto
Marinho Foundation. There is a consistent level of com-
munication and commitment between partners that great-
ly facilitates collaboration on projects. 
In addition to providing low-income communities with
Internet access, Viva Rio facilitates the exchange of infor-
mation between the favelas and the “Internet community.”
Specifically the two partners are developing the first web-
sites to post articles written by and for low-income com-
munities. Viva Rio also provides a variety of credit and
financial literacy programs to micro-entrepreneurs and
low-income community members. VivaCred, Viva Rio’s
flagship credit program has provided more than US$5 mil-
lion in low-interest loans. The VIVASEGURO program
informs community members about insurance and savings
as well as providing life and health insurance services.
Coupled with its efforts in technology and microenter-
prise development, Viva Rio established a fair trade initia-
tive. The initiative links products made by low-income
communities into national and international markets.
Business clients include Lojas Americanas, Hermes, and
the World Council of Churches. One of the most visible
relationships the initiative brokered in 1992 was with
women microentrepreneurs. On behalf of these women,
Viva Rio negotiated a major contract for the manufacture
of T-shirts for the world’s largest outdoor concert, Rock in
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Rio, which was sponsored by O Globo. 
In an effort to expand of the success of the Rio Rock
Concert deal, the IAF made a grant to Viva Rio to further
develop the potential for women-led sewing cooperatives.
While Rio Rock was an enormous first step, women cloth-
ing manufacturers continue to face obstacles in managing
their production in synch with seasonal demands for their
products. Viva Rio is now helping the marketing efforts of
six women-led sewing cooperatives through a dynamic
partnership including the private and public sectors that
will develop a virtual store. The store will sell products
made in the favela communities. By opening these entre-
preneurs to the global markets rather than restricting them
to local ones, members of the sewing cooperatives as well
as the larger favela community will have a more stable
source of income. The store will also create the opportuni-
ty for these entrepreneurs to create a network by which to
bid for larger contracts. The site will use the “Viva Rio Fair
Trade Brasil” brand name for community-made products. 
Viva Rio realized that the sewing cooperatives would
also need technical assistance in order to grow with
increased demand for their products. As such, the grant
will allow these sewing cooperatives to purchase equip-
ment and receive specific training. Ten industrial sewing
machines will be purchased to improve the quality of pro-
duction. Courses in marketing and business development
will be given by Viva Rio. Based on initial efforts under the
grant, several retail shops have been opened in local malls,
airport kiosks, and booths in outdoor fairs to sell coopera-
tive clothing and T-shirts. 
Viva Rio is also tying in its Future Stations program by
constructing three new stations in low-income communi-
ties. These stations will act as business centers providing a
variety of computer and business management classes.
Additionally the stations will provide access to Viva Rio’s
credit, insurance, and commercialization services. Finally,
the IAF grant introduces a unique evaluation system that
is client driven and based on feedback. Focus groups will
be conducted in which participants will provide their
thoughts on whether the services they are receiving are
relevant and beneficial so that Viva Rio can then better tai-
lor services to meet community member needs. This type
of marketing methodology applied to community devel-
opment work is revolutionary and illustrates the type of
crossover benefits that can occur in multisector partner-
ships. 
Both partners have benefited from their history of col-
laboration. Viva Rio has increased visibility for its social
campaigns as O Globo brings well-known personalities to
Viva Rio events. For O Globo, Viva Rio is a reference point
in community development work, and the partnership is a
natural fit since the organizations share a common objec-
tive of promoting a culture of peace and bettering the lives
of members of disadvantaged communities. It is also an
efficient CSR program in that it is closely related to O
Globo’s core business of communications. As a result of
the virtual store project, both Viva Rio and O Globo see
new opportunities for more mutually beneficial collabora-
tion. A program to allow community radio stations to for-
mally spend time at O Globo radio stations will provide
exposure to professional broadcasting for favela commu-
nity members and improve local broadcast in the favelas;
additionally the exchange will introduce new broadcast
material for O Globo listeners.
Case 4: BanhCafe (Honduras)
Although traditionally one of Honduras’ largest exports,
the coffee sector has been devastated in recent years by the
continuing fall of prices as well as the aftereffects of
Hurricane Mitch. In 2001, coffee prices reached an eight-
year low, with prices falling below US$ .50/lb. The sector
that generated more than US$350 million of revenue in
1995 brought in only US$89 million in 2001. This has had
a tremendously negative effect on the overall economy,
and is felt most strongly by the country’s small coffee
farmers. One financial institution, BanhCafe, is working to
revive the industry by increasing the well-being of its
smallest suppliers.
The eighth largest private bank in Honduras, BanhCafe
is a coffee bank that was created in 1981, partially as a
result of the coffee boom on the late 1970s and early 80s.
Shareholders of the bank included coffee producers and
exporters. Sixty percent of the bank’s capital came from
producers, which has helped to define BanhCafe as a
financial institution with a democratic capital base. In
Honduras, 70 percent of the coffee sector is composed of
small farmers who produce less than 10,000 pounds of cof-
fee each. Of these, 40 percent produce less than 2,000
pounds each per year. BanhCafe was designed to fulfill the
specific needs of producers and exporters in the coffee
industry. It is the only bank in the country that provides
industry-specific services including branch offices in the
remote, hard-to-reach communities where coffee is grown;
direct access to financial services; and the punctual credit
needed by producers and exporters. 
By the mid-1980s it was evident that the bank's services
were not reaching the smallest and poorest of the farmers,
who, although not profitable customers from the bank’s
perspective, constitute the majority of Honduras’ coffee
industry. The bank considered reaching these farmers
through not-for-profit projects but could not undertake
social programs due to financial industry regulations as
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well as institutional capacity. In response, BanhCafe creat-
ed a foundation, the Fundación Banhcafe, with a mission
“to contribute to bettering the conditions in which men
and women with low income levels in coffee farming com-
munities live, facilitating a process of development that is
sustainable, ecological, and equitable with a participatory
and cooperative focus.” Though its mission statement is
unchanged, the foundation’s programmatic emphasis has
shifted. It is no longer interested solely in ways to make
the coffee industry work better for poor farmers but has
placed greater emphasis on social progress. 
One reason for the effectiveness of the foundation and
its appeal to the IAF as a development partner is its ties to
the coffee bank. This relationship has strengthened the
work of both the foundation and the bank in several ways.
Strategically, for the  bank's shareholders the concept of
creating value is important. Part of that value is the ability
to reach all members of the coffee industry who may be
future customers. The foundation is a vehicle to reach a
broader portion of the target market, regardless of income.
Another component is the reputation and image of the
bank. Honduras has 22 banks, some of which have failed
in recent years. That Banhcafe was able to avoid this finan-
cial instability has earned it the trust of the general public.
Fundación Banhcafe is strongly associated with Banhcafe,
which provides funding and has a stake in ensuring that
projects are carried out. With this credibility and commit-
ment, an alliance with the bank can lead to strategic part-
nerships with other institutions, both national and interna-
tional. Fundación Banhcafe has undertaken joint projects
with the European Union Bank Fund and the Honduran
government. Finally, the bank has already developed
physical and human infrastructure in coffee communities
of which the foundation can take advantage while the
foundation’s microenterprise programs benefit from staff
who formerly worked for the bank.
Ideally, the IAF seeks cross-sector partnerships that tap
expertise in three broad areas: community development
methodology, organizational capacity to carry out projects
in low-income locales, and strategic planning capabilities.
The former two are traits integral to the operations of civil
society organizations while the latter is more characteristic
of business organizations. Because of its institutional ties,
history, and mission, Fundación Banhcafe is a hybrid of all
three areas. The merit of partnering with this type of
organization is evidenced by the partnership’s response to
the Hurricane Mitch crisis. After Mitch, the IAF-
Fundación Banhcafe alliance allowed for rapid and
responsive funding to communities most in need as the
foundation was prepared operationally and strategically
to receive and implement an emergency program. Just as
importantly, in the long run it allowed for the continued
development of sustainable programs, which attests to the
versatility of the partnership.
Though Fundación Banhcafe manages a variety of pro-
grams across many thematic areas, the IAF participation is
focused on providing funding for the microcredit and edu-
cational credit programs. Access to credit continues to be a
challenge for small farmers in the agricultural sector and
coffee farmers are no exception. Indeed, given the current
coffee crisis, the need for credit is greater that ever. Groups
of 12 people, each representing one family, are formed to
receive micro-loan disbursements. The group comes
together to elect officers and to receive training; however,
each individual is responsible for his or her own loans and
the performance of each individual also affects the credit
worthiness of the group as a whole. Part of the way in
which the micro-lending program adds value for the com-
munity is a savings component whereby whole families
open savings accounts with Banhcafe. The savings compo-
nent of the program has a 10 percent savings requirement
with accounts for each person opened at the local
Banhcafe offices. There are no restrictions on how the
money is used. Some members choose to continue their
traditional farming activities that are more sustainable
with regular access to credit, while others try new income-
generating endeavors such as small shops. Besides devel-
oping customers for the bank, the program teaches finan-
cial literacy and practical personal financial management
of debt.  
Another challenge faced by poor Hondurans is access
to education. Most of the coffee community families do
not have the financial resources to allow their children to
participate in higher education, whether it is vocational,
technical training, or college/university studies. In
response, Fundación Banhcafe developed a student loan
program available to the young people of coffee-produc-
ing communities. The Educational Credit Program loans
money to students pursuing studies in two areas—voca-
tional training and university studies. Courses of study in
technical areas include automotive mechanics, sewing and
textiles, carpentry, and nursing. At the university level,
students pursue degrees in tourism, international busi-
ness, systems engineering, and pharmacy. One of the sec-
ondary benefits of this program is that it is encouraging
economic diversification among the younger generation of
communities dependent upon coffee.
Conclusions and Future Research Initiatives
As illustrated in each of the case studies, strategic cooper-
ation and collaboration among local governments, private
sector firms, and civil society organizations has led to
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increased development initiatives. Furthermore, when
the private sector takes an interest in microenterprise
development and subsequently global poverty reduction,
a potentially powerful positive economic effect will
accrue to the community as well to the private firm. It is
proposed that the strategic collaboration and subsequent
development effects will lead to an increase in economic
initiatives. Thus, future research endeavors may look to
further operationalize the linkages suggested in Figure 1
and develop empirical support for the more formal
propositions that will evolve from this research. Linking
literature from studies on incubators and intrapreneur-
ship will also provide a particularly viable research
approach in the future. A future research agenda may also
include comparative analyses across regions and cultures
of microenterprise collaboration among local govern-
ments, private firms, and civil society organizations.
Finally, the concepts of reciprocity and trust among the
partners of these microenterprises may be further
explored over a longer time period to study the linkages
of these concepts and the economic development of third-
sector communities.
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Entrepreneurs tend to be self-styled “idea” people. Theyoften believe they have the next “Big Concept”—onewhich could change the world, reaffirm their self-worth,
and, of course, make them and their venture team a fortune.
In contrast, as they build a company to implement their
business dream, entrepreneurs also tend to eschew or trivialize
administrative details. Why should they waste their creative
juices on minutia? As a result of this insensitivity to detail,
these captains of capitalism often trip in their entrepreneurial
journey. For example, they might:
• Forget to remit payroll taxes on schedule.
• Fail to document the justification underpinning the dis-
missal of a key employee.
• Allow the company’s liability insurance to lapse. 
• Neglect to report sales usage tax.
• Verbally grant employee incentive stock options during an
informal luncheon meeting, at a yet-to-be-determined
exercise price and without the board of directors’ approval.
Some wag once noted that “God is in the details.” As for
finding God, many entrepreneurs are stunned to find out
that God is not that reflection in their mirror! To sustain
this spiritual metaphor, the Church of Entrepreneurship
requires that the entrepreneur seek salvation and do
penance by tending to those distasteful administrative nits
that otherwise might transform into future mortal sins.
Such “sins” might manifest themselves as
• noncompliance with the IRS;
• noncompliance with the EEO;
• noncompliance with the SEC;
• significant (and possibly unnecessary) stock option
expenses imposed by the company’s audit firm;
• costly errors, accidents, or acts-of-God that are not
covered by insurance; or
• operational shortcomings in areas regulated by an
alphabet soup of oversight agencies (FDA, FTC, FCC,
OSHA, etc.).
As a practicing entrepreneur involved with dozens of
ventures for more than two decades, I confess that I am not
without sin. The Church, after all, is for sinners. From lis-
tening to the many sermons over the years of those wiser
than me, I have learned—by looking after administrative
housekeeping issues—how to sin less and enjoy business
success more! Seeking God (in the details) can be self-ful-
filling (and profitable).
In today’s venture world, we are emerging from more
than three years of economic recession. Most entrepre-
neurs have been in their foxholes simply trying to survive.
Now is the time for them to reestablish a more aggressive
(entrepreneurial) approach to growing business.
Opportunities should be numerous. As will the potential
pitfalls! What details should an entrepreneur tend to in
order to avoid these pitfalls?
1. Choose, evaluate, and upgrade the company’s profes-
sional advisers (legal, accounting, banking, investment
banking, board of directors). 
• Correlate work product with hours of work and
hourly rates.
• Choose individuals with knowledge of the compa-
ny’s industry. Their contacts may help in sales leads
and partnering opportunities.
• Irony: The closer the relationship with advisers, the
greater the return, at often a lesser cost.
• Case Example: Recent tax law (JGTRRA-2003)
reduces C-Corp tax rate for dividends to 15 percent
from 38.6 percent. Advisers may want to increase
dividends to provide lower-taxed “compensation”
for inside shareholders, while reducing the cash
outflow and expense to the company. An alternative
decision would be for an S-Corp to consider the effi-
cacy of converting to a C-Corp to provide the prin-
cipals with a lower tax rate. This type of issue is
where advisers really earn their stripes.
2. Upgrade financial reporting standards.
• The sooner private companies adopt public compa-
ny (FASB-like) standards, the easier it will be to cre-
ate an exit position for shareholder liquidity. An
acquiring company will likely require SEC-compat-
ible financial information. An IPO requires two
years of audited financials, so there is substantial
lead time involved. Many private companies are
adopting Sarbanes-Oxley rules for corporate gover-
nance and documentation of transactions, large and
small. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is perhaps the
single most important piece of legislation affecting
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the corporate world since the U.S. securities laws of
the 1930s. The SOA includes rules on corporate gov-
ernance, financial disclosure, and the practice of
public accounting. 
• Entrepreneurs must understand that pending FASB
proposals point to the expensing of employee stock
options value. This has significant implications for
an important venture team incentive. The current
thinking is to grant fewer options to fewer employ-
ees, exercisable at market price or higher. 
• Public companies continue to be required to provide
faster reporting. The time (from period end) for 10K
(annual) reports has been reduced from 90 to 60
days. For 10Q (quarterly) reports, the time has been
reduced from 45 to 30 days. This recent regulation
change has implications for the quality and quanti-
ty of support staff to provide faster turnaround
reporting.
3. Monitor the external influences on Human Resources.
• Retirement plans have experienced a sea of change
over the past couple of decades. The trend is toward
defined contribution plans. Recent tax laws (EGTR-
RA-2001) provide for a more generous contributive
calculation for small business and self-employed.
As a result, 401(k) plans have become more attrac-
tive options than SEP-IRAs, SIMPLE IRAs, profit
sharing, or money purchase plans.
• Laws impacting eligibility for overtime pay have
become more restrictive. Senior executives and pro-
fessionals are generally ineligible, as are employees
who earn more than $100,000 a year.
• The HR group needs to be aware of employees who
are “tax avoiders.”  These potentially dangerous
people falsify W-4 forms for economic or political
reasons to avoid paying taxes.
• The strong trend is for employees to share, increas-
ingly, in the cost of health care. Recently enacted
laws allow for the tax-free creation of Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs) to allow employees to
save for medical outlays.
4. Reduce expenses.
• Eliminate certain managed costs. For example, have
fewer people take fewer business trips. Instead, uti-
lize more video- and tele-conferencing opportuni-
ties. Only the deal-closers need to hit the road for
face-to-face meetings.
• Outsource those line items of expense that other
firms can guarantee (contractually) to perform
cheaper and better. Companies such as Google
(where the entrepreneurs’ own start-up money is in
the company) show high profitability using out-
sourcing.
• Make high ROI investments to save money.
Example: Genzyme’s new HQ building in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a “green” facility.
While it cost 15 percent more than a comparable
building, the design is expected to save 38 percent
per year in energy costs and 32 percent per year in
water costs.
5. Understand that the landscape for raising capital is
ever-changing.
• Private funds from individuals increasingly are
available through formal “angel” networks or
investment clubs; some of which are now managed
much like venture capital funds.
• Venture capital is still being held back, but is poised
to break loose very soon. Companies need to be pre-
pared to exploit this funding opportunity by having
updated financials, business plans, and presenta-
tions.
• The going-public (IPO) option is reemerging, with a
few wrinkles:
o Low-end investment banking firms were large-
ly eliminated in the most recent recession. The
$10 to $25 million IPOs will now be rare. The
larger investment banking firms seek larger
deals to generate larger fees.
o Performance standards for IPO candidate com-
panies have been eased. Two years ago, revenues
of $60 to $80 million, with two profitable quarters
were required; now, $35 million in revenue and
no profits seem to satisfy underwriters.
o Two new forms of IPOs have emerged. The
Dutch Auction, employed by Google for exam-
ple, is an option for well-publicized companies
to achieve market-based valuations, while
avoiding hefty investment banking fees. A
Canadian format—Income Deposit Securities
(IDSs)—is designed for low-growth, cash-flow
dependable companies. IDSs combine, in one
unit, both equity and debt.
6. Personal fortune: Know how to cash-in.
• Exit options for the entrepreneur and the venture
team include:
o private sale of shares,
o private sale of company, and
o sale of publicly traded shares.
• Recent changes in tax laws make dividends more
attractive (15% tax rate).
• Sale of publicly traded shares by insiders is subject
to complex and restrictive SEC regulations.
• Recent changes in estate laws impact inheritance
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economics. While the federal government is gradu-
ally eliminating the “death tax,” certain states
(wanting to maintain a revenue stream) are aggres-
sively restructuring their estate laws, creating sepa-
rate inheritance taxes that are imposed on heirs
rather than the estates. This obviously raises issues
for where the entrepreneur wants to establish per-
manent residence.
In conclusion, entrepreneurs have enlightened self-
interest to do the “dirty work” of getting enmeshed in the
details of their business, monitoring the external business
environment, and grappling with the overall growing
complexity of their financial empire.
God is indeed in the details. Regrettably, many entre-
preneurs (myself included) tend to be ungodly messy. We
are not saintly. We tend to be Oscar Madison-like, as
opposed to Felix Unger-like (the neat one of The Odd
Couple). Personally, I find administrative housekeeping
chores to be distasteful. To a large degree, I have survived
by relying on a business partner (the saintly and capable
Cindy) who has worked with me for more than 20 years
and who reviews every piece of paper that flows through
my office. Reliance on another person requires extreme
trust and faith. It is all part of the Entrepreneurial Creed.
You need not walk the road to salvation alone. Along the
way, keep current with both the general business and
industry-specific periodicals. If necessary, get an adminis-
trative helper/partner/Guardian Angel. Do an organiza-
tional audit of all administrative, legal, financial, and
accounting activities. In any case, “Just do it!”May God
bless all entrepreneurs (and keep the sinful details under
control)!
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M averick: The Success Story Behind the World’s MostUnusual Workplace by Ricardo Semler (which hassold 1.1 million copies worldwide) “is not a
business book. It is a book about work, and how it can be
changed for the better” (Library Journal). Although pub-
lished in 1993, the book provids readers with an insight-
ful journey into the entrepreneurial experiences of a man-
agerial maverick. A graduate of Harvard Business School,
today Semler is known around the world for champi-
oning his employee-friendly management style. First
published in Brazil in 1988 as Turning The Tables, Maverick
has become the all-time best-selling nonfiction book in
Brazil’s history.
Whether you are an entrepreneur seeking to create a
company that “thinks outside the box,” or happen to be
looking for a way to reinvigorate a stagnant, slow-mov-
ing, bureaucratic organization, this book should be
required reading—regardless of when it was originally
published. Semler's new book, The Seven-Day Weekend,
recently released in Europe, is scheduled to be published
by Portfolio and will be available in April 2004 (ISBN
0712677909).
Every entrepreneur needs to realize that change is pos-
sible. You only have to want it to happen bad enough to
make change take place. You also need to realize that
everything you thought could never happen in your com-
pany has already happened. Where? At Semco S.A., the
South American manufacturing company Ricardo Semler
inherited from his father, Antonio Semler. It was refresh-
ing to read a book about a CEO (a term which is never
used at Semco where workers and bosses are typically
referred to as associates and coordinators) who, in the
mid-1980s, took it upon himself to radically change the
culture of his traditionally grounded industrial equip-
ment company.
Semco S.A. was founded by Antonio Semler in 1912.
Today it manufactures pumps used to empty oil tankers,
high volume industrial dishwashers, cooling units for air
conditioners, and various types of industrial mixers for
the food industry. On the surface Semco S.A. is not the
type of company that would appear to be on the verge of
redefining the corporate management paradigm. It is,
however, precisely because of the types of businesses that
Semco S.A. is involved in that makes this book so pro-
foundly interesting.
“According to his reasoning, medieval cathedral
builders produced magnificent works of art virtually
without supervision. Why couldn’t the men and women
of his workforce—adults who made complex and far-
reaching decisions in their daily lives—be trusted to
choose the colors of their uniforms and decide when to
start their workdays? Come to think of it, why couldn’t
they organize their pay scales and approve their bosses?
Why couldn’t they decide what new ventures Semco
could invest in and veto plans proposed by the CEO? No
reason at all” (Shinn 2004).
What steps did Semler take to reinvent the culture at
his fathers companies? Workers set their own production
quotas and can come to work anytime between 7  AM and
9 AM. Employees decide among themselves the best time
to come to work. Employees redesign the products they
make, their work environments, and even formulate their
own marketing plans. Bosses run their units with unheard
of freedom and determine business strategies without
interference from “top management.” Each division is
allowed to set its own salary structure. All financial infor-
mation is discussed openly and freely. If employees need
assistance in making sense of the financials, classes are
held to assist workers in understanding the real meaning
of the “numbers.” There are reception desks with no
receptionists. There are no secretaries or personal assis-
tants. There are no executive dining rooms and no person-
alized parking spaces. It does not matter what employees
wear to work. Office workers and managers are allowed
to dress as they please. Employees required to wear uni-
forms are able to select the style and color of their uni-
forms. 
Book Review
A Classic Book—Revisited 
Peter Maresco
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At Semco a major paradigm shift has taken place
where managers and workers make decisions, not just the
chairperson. One of the first undertakings Ricardo Semler
took upon himself after taking over from his father was to
throw out all the rules. He reduced the layers of manage-
ment from 12 to 3 and reduced the “corporate” staff by
more than 75 percent. At Semco, each new employee
receives a copy of The Survival Manual, a 20-page book-
let with plenty of cartoons, few words, and one central
message: Use your common sense.
At Semco the standard policy is to have no policy. For
those who travel, there are no travel restrictions other
than using your head. There are no departments, no rules,
and no audits. The entire budget system has been simpli-
fied. Semler stripped away the blind authoritarianism
that diminishes productivity. Workers are self-governing
and self-managing. In fact, workers have, in most cases,
mastered several jobs.
Before people are hired or promoted to leadership
positions they are first interviewed by everyone who will
be working for them. Every six months managers are
evaluated and the results posted for everyone to see.
Employees actively participate in making major decisions
and share in 22 percent of the profits. Participative man-
agement in every sense of the word is the norm. The
desire to work at Semco is so strong that it is not unusual
to have a backlog of more than 2,000 applications at any
given time.
You are probably thinking, “That’s fine for some South
American company but that could never happen here in
the States, especially in my company.” The point, howev-
er, is that it could happen if you wanted it to happen.
There is an old joke that goes something like this: How
many psychologists does it take to change a lightbulb?
Only one, but the lightbulb has to want to change. 
What makes this story especially intriguing is that it
didn’t happen in Seattle, Washington, or Silicon Valley,
California, but in Brazil—despite its recessions, high rates
of inflation, and a generally chaotic national economic
environment. There were even union problems to over-
come but the key here is that they were all worked out.
Prof. Nicholson, head of the London Business School
recently wrote in the Harvard Business Review that
“Semler’s model was the only one to really respect the
stone age nature of human behavior (the many insights
from evolutionary psychology that tells us that we’re far
more often feeling our way through decisions than think-
ing our way through).” 
Put Maverick’s operating philosophy together with Tom
Peter’s reinventing work ideas (most particularly in his
The Circle of Innovation). Then, add in some Greenleaf ser-
vant leadership and combine with some shared vision (a
la Chapter 11 of Senge’s Fifth Discipline). You then have an
excellent recipe for best practice 21st-century entrepre-
neurial management (Murphy 2002).
“Today, Semler spends much of his time away from the
corporate offices, giving lectures or merely traveling with
his family. His new book, The Seven-Day Weekend, stresses
the value of free time away from the office and time for
creative thinking in the office. Such priorities, he notes,
have raised Semco’s revenues from $35 million to $160
million in the last 6 years” (BizEd 2004).
Read this book with an open mind. Don’t make excus-
es for why change can’t occur in your company.
Remember, if you really want to change things, you can.
An added benefit from reading this book is its appen-
dix, Ricardo’s A,B,C’s, which is broken into four sections:
• Section A—The Semco Cure for Time Sickness: A
brief overview of time management the Semco way.
• Section B—The Semco Survival Manual: Excerpts
from the small 22-page cartoon “rulebook” given to each
Semco employee. It contains a series of cartoons illustrat-
ing various aspects of the Semco philosophy on every-
thing from unions to hiring to evaluations to job security.
• Section C—Seen from Below: How Semco
Employees Evaluate Their Employees: The question-
naire used by Semco employees to evaluate their supervi-
sors.
• Section D —A Semco Lexicon:
The Semco Survival Manual
The following sections provide the contents of the booklet
given to each Semco employee upon hiring. It constitutes
the company's only set of rules.
Organization Chart
Semco doesn’t use a formal organization chart. When it is
absolutely necessary to sketch the structure of the compa-
ny, it always does so in pencil and dispenses with it as
soon as possible.
Hiring
When people are hired or promoted, others in that unit
have the opportunity to interview and evaluate the candi-
dates before any decision is made.
Working Hours
Semco has flexible working hours and the responsibility
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for setting and keeping track of them rests with each
employee. People work at different speeds and differ in
their performance depending on the time of day. Semco
does its best to adapt to each person’s desires and needs.
Working Environment
We want all our people to feel free to change and adapt
their working areas as they please. Painting walls or
machines, adding plants or decorating the space around
you is up to you. The company has no rules about this
and dosen’t want to have any. Change the area around
you according to your tastes and desires and those of the
people who work with you.
Unions
Unions are an important form of worker protection. At
Semco, workers are free to unionize and the persecution
of those connected with unions is absolutely forbidden.
Unions and the company don’t always agree, or even get
along, but we insist that there is always respect and dia-
logue.
Strikes
Strikes are considered normal. They are part and parcel of
democracy. No one is persecuted for participating in
strikes as long as they represent what the people of the
company think and feel. The workers’ assemblies are sov-
ereign in this respect.
Participation
Our philosophy is built on participation and involvement.
Don’t settle down. Give opinions, seek opportunities and
advancement, always say what you think. Don’t just
become one more person in the company. Your opinion is
always interesting, even if no one asked you for it. Get in
touch with the factory committee and participate in elec-
tions. Make your voice count.
Evaluation by Subordinates
Twice a year you will receive a questionnaire to fill out
that enables you to say what you think of your boss. Be
frank and honest, and not just on the form, but also in the
discussion that follows.
Factory Committees
Employees at Semco are guaranteed representation
through the Factory committee of each business unit.
Read the charter, participate, make sure your committee
effectively defends your interests—which at times will
not coincide with Semco’s interests. We see this conflict as
healthy and necessary.
Authority
Many positions at Semco carry with them hierarchical
authority. But efforts to pressure subordinates or cause
them to work out of fear or insecurity, or that show any
type of disrespect, are considered unacceptable use of
authority and will not be tolerated.
Job Security
Anyone who has been with us for three years, or has
reached the age of fifty, has special protection and can
only be dismissed after a long series of approvals. This
does not mean that Semco has no layoff policy but it helps
to increase the security of our people.
Change
Semco is a place where there are big changes from time to
time. Don’t worry about them. We consider them healthy
and positive. Watch the changes without fear. They are
characteristic of our company and its culture.
Clothing and Appearance
Neither has any importance at Semco. A person’s appear-
ance is not a factor in hiring or promotion. Everyone
knows what he or she likes or needs to wear. Feel at
ease—wear only your common sense.
Private Life
Semco has no business interfering with what people do
when they are away from work as long as it does not
interfere with work. Of course, our human relations
department is at your service for any help or support you
may need.
Company Loans
The company loans money to its people in unforeseen sit-
uations. Thus, loans to cover the purchase of homes, cars,
or other predictable expenses are not included. But the
company wants you to know that the day you run into
difficult, and unexpected, financial problems that it will
be here for you.
Pride
It’s only worth working in a place in which you can be
proud. Create pride by ensuring the quality of everything
you do. Don’t let a product leave the company if it’s not
up to the highest standards. Don’t write a letter or memo
that is not absolutely honest. Don’t let the level of dignity
drop.
Communication
Semco and its people must strive to communicate with
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frankness and honesty. You must be able to believe fully
in what is said to you by your coworkers. Demand this
transparency when you are in doubt.
Informality
Promoting a birthday party at the end of the workday,
barging into a meeting where you are not invited, or
using nicknames are all part of our culture. Don’t be shy
or stick to formalities.
Suggestions
Semco does not believe in giving prizes for suggestions.
We want everyone to speak out, and all opinions are wel-
come, but we don’t think that it is healthy to reward them
with prizes of money.
Semco Women
Women in Brazil have fewer employment, promotion,
and financial opportunities than men. At Semco, women
have various programs, run by women, that seek to
reduce this discrimination. They are known as “Semco
women.” 
If you are a woman, participate.
If you aren’t don’t feel threatened and don’t fight
against this effort. 
Vacations
Semco is not one of those companies that believes anyone
is irreplaceable. Everyone should take their 30 days of
vacation every year. It is vital for your health and the
company’s welfare. No excuse is good enough for accu-
mulating vacation days for “later.”
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